Sport, society and the voluntary sector

The Research Council of Norway
Division of Culture and Society

Proceedings from the Work Shop

Research on Doping in Sport

Norwegian University of
Sport and Physical Education

Oslo
May 22, 2001
Foreword

Starting in 2001, the research programme Sport, society and the voluntary sector has been given responsibilities and resources for the funding of research on the use and abuse of drugs in sport and its implications for society. As a first step, the programme board decided to arrange an international workshop on the topic. The workshop was arranged in Oslo May 22, 2001 (see enclosed programme). The aim was to get an overview of the status of research on the use and abuse of drugs in sport from both national and international perspectives, and to establish international networks for future research. What follows here are the essays of the majority of the invited guest speakers. The board hopes that these essays can inform and inspire potential applicants for funding of doping research and increase the quality of their applications.

On behalf of the board of the research programme Sport, society and the voluntary sector,

Sigmund Loland

Oslo, August 2001.
Content

Sportive Nationalism and Doping
John Hoberman, University of Texas, USA ......................................................... 7

Doping in sport: a medical sociological perspective
Ivan Waddington, University of Leicester, UK .................................................. 11

Sport policy and doping: a research agenda
Barrie Houlihan, Loughborough University, UK ............................................. 23

Coping with Doping: Sport associations under organizational stress
Karl-Heinrich Bette, Universität Heidelberg, Uwe Schimank, Fern Universität Hagen, Germany ................................................................. 51

Program ................................................................. 71
List of participants ................................................................. 73
Announcement of funds ................................................................. 75
Sportive Nationalism and Doping

John Hoberman
Department of Germanic Languages, University of Texas, USA

Sportive nationalism may be defined as the use of elite athletes by governments to demonstrate national fitness and vitality for the purpose of enhancing national prestige. The practice of sportive nationalism can take different forms depending on the nature of the government that seeks prestige benefits from international sporting successes. A dictatorship such as that of the former East Germany was able to operate in an uninhibited manner that maximized the efficient use of its population while employing a secret and comprehensive doping program whose existence it continually denied. At the same time, East German officials claimed that its elite athletes demonstrated the superiority of the society that had produced them.

Unmitigated sportive nationalism of this kind is generally incompatible with the ethos of a democratic society. West German officials who once had to deal with domestic resentment of East German athletic superiority have at times felt obligated to take a more temperate position on sportive nationalism that refused success at all costs. In December 1987, for example, the Interior Minister declared the federal government's strong support for elite sport that would include appropriate sports medical support but exclude the doping of West German athletes. He claimed that national mobilization on behalf of athletic success would somehow put the welfare of the athlete above the nationalist pressures that demanded success: "The athlete must not be turned into a plaything of political interests. We can approve of top-level sport only when it remains within the sphere of ideological and political neutrality." This emphasis on creating humane conditions for high-performance sport was reiterated by the President of the Federal Republic, Richard von Weizsäcker, at a ceremony honoring a group of top West German athletes.

At the same time, President von Weizsäcker pointed to the nationalistic pressures on elite athletes who represent democratic societies. "Recently," he said, "there have been a number of comments made concerning the weak performance of [West] German sport at the highest level. It is my view that premature condemnations in this area should be avoided, since it would be wrong to measure the quality of a country by the number of its Olympic medals." The West German swimmer Michael Groß, an Olympic and world champion, endorsed this position: "I do not share the view that an inability to win medals says anything about our society's ability to compete," he commented. Still, to the best of my knowledge, no sitting government has ever renounced sportive nationalism as its fundamental approach to international athletic competition. This transnational loyalty to the principle of sportive nationalism has undermined the international campaign against doping by giving national sports officials tacit permission and even encouragement to withhold support from effective anti-doping measures that might impose limits on performance.

The doping problem in international sport has complicated the practice of sportive nationalism by requiring that an anti-doping rhetoric accompany the standard rhetoric of competitive
success. The remarkable exception to this rule occurred in 1977 when the conservative West German politician Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) told the Bundestag that West German athletes should have access to anabolic steroids to advance the national interest: "We advocate only the most limited use of these drugs, and only under the complete control of the sports physicians because it is clear that there are [sports] disciplines in which the use of these drugs is necessary to remain competitive at the international level." The sheer political incorrectness of this statement makes it clear that it belongs to the era that preceded official expressions of alarm about the steroid epidemic in high-performance sport. At the same time, it is only one of many statements made by West German politicians over many years about the critical role elite sport plays in sustaining national identity and morale. It should also be emphasized that this politician's willingness to dope athletes in the national interest was eccentric only in its honesty. In fact, many sports officials and politicians around the world have either subverted or done little to advance the international anti-doping campaign that is supposed to discourage the use of performance-enhancing drugs among the world's elite athletes.

Sportive nationalism remains an obstacle to anti-doping efforts in part because international regulation of doping is still relatively ineffectual. The fact that international organizations, such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), have assumed formal responsibility for doping control should not automatically be equated with effective global enforcement. In fact, the politics of doping remains an essentially national, rather than international, phenomenon, since the politics of doping differ substantially from one country to another.

Responsibility for doping control may rest with governmental or non-governmental bodies. In Germany the federal funding of elite sport means that doping issues are debated in the Bundestag. The state prosecutor's office in Berlin tried and convicted East German trainers and doctors on doping charges during the period 1999-2000. State prosecutors and police agencies in France and Italy have moved aggressively against doping operations in professional cycling. In Norway and Denmark the Ministry of Culture has some formal responsibility for doping matters. In the United States this responsibility is vested primarily in the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) which has been independent of the federal government (and Congressional funding) since 1978. The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) is affiliated with, but formally independent of, the USOC.

Non-governmental status is not, however, a guarantee of effective doping control, since proxy sportive nationalism that enlists non-governmental actors can frustrate doping control as effectively as the executive sportive nationalism that achieved its apotheosis in the former East German regime. Over the past two decades the USOC has forced out three physicians whose anti-doping positions were too militant for the USOC leadership: Irving Dardik (1985), Robert Voy (1989) and Wade Exum (2000). In October 2000 the Norwegian Minister of Culture forced the resignation of her own department head with responsibility for doping affairs, Hans B. Skaset, after he threatened to withdraw government support for elite sport unless sports leaders stayed out of ethical "grey zones" that sought performance enhancement in techniques such as dietary supplements and altitude chambers.

In summary, sportive nationalism undermines doping control by creating incentives for many officials, in both governments and sports federations, to tolerate doping by athletes and the
physicians who are willing to collaborate with them. As a kind of populism, sportive nationalism is also evident in the many public demonstrations of support for athletes who are known to have doped or are suspected of having doped. Sportive nationalism continues to prevail as national policy around the world because sportive prestige is regarded as a national security issue.
Doping in sport: a medical sociological perspective

Ivan Waddington
Centre for Research into Sport and Society
University of Leicester, UK.

The central objectives of this paper are: (i) to provide from a sociological perspective, and more particularly from the perspective of medical sociology, an overview of research into doping in sport and (ii) to identify, again from the perspective of medical sociology, problems for further research.

Before I address these two key issues, however, it may be useful to outline briefly what is known about current patterns of doping in sport and the way in which those patterns have changed since anti-doping controls were introduced in the 1960s; this is an essential preliminary task, both in terms of identifying the key sociological problems and in terms of developing more effective policy in this area.

i) Patterns of drug use in modern sport

It is of course not possible to arrive at any precise estimate of the extent of drug use in sport, for those involved in doping will almost inevitably seek to conceal their activities. It is also clear that the incidence of positive tests is a poor - some would argue so poor as to be virtually useless – index of the extent of drug use in elite sport (Waddington, 2000). Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is a variety of sources of information which, taken together, enable us to build up a picture of the patterns of drug use in sport; these sources include autobiographies of leading athletes and ex-athletes (Sanderson, 1986; Kimmage, 1990; 1998; Reiterer, 2000), public statements of sports administrators (Gold, 1989; de Merode, cited in Coomber, 1993) and specialists in sports medicine (Voy, 1991; Beckett and Puffer, cited in Doust et al, 1988; Millar, 1996), and perhaps most revealingly, the evidence of formal judicial inquiries (for example, the US Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Steroid Abuse in America, chaired by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. in 1989, or the Dubin Inquiry in Canada which reported in 1990), as well as information provided in the court cases arising from the doping scandal in the 1998 Tour de France. These data enable us to make a number of points about the level and patterns of drug use in sport with a fair degree of confidence (Waddington, 2000:171-5). Among the more important of these patterns are the following:

1. There has been a substantial increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs by athletes since anti-doping controls were introduced in the 1960s.

2. In athletics, the use of performance-enhancing drugs, which was originally concentrated in the heavy throwing events, has subsequently spread to many other track and field events.

3. The use of performance-enhancing drugs has also spread from athletics, weightlifting and cycling - the three sports in which drugs appear to have been most frequently used in the 1960s - to most other sports.
4. Although the prevalence of drug use varies considerably from one sport to another it is clear that in many sports doping is widespread and that in some – professional cycling is perhaps the clearest example - the likelihood is that a majority, and perhaps a very large majority, of competitors are using performance-enhancing drugs.

5. The use of performance-enhancing drugs has undergone a process of diffusion from elite level sport to lower levels, with anabolic steroids being freely available and widely used in many gyms, particularly those frequented by bodybuilders (Lenehan et al., 1996; Monaghan, 2001).

These data provide an important starting point for any analysis of drug use in sport for two reasons. Firstly, it is important to recognise the very limited effectiveness of current policy; indeed, the most charitable judgement which can be made of that policy is that ‘it isn’t working well’ (Waddington, 2000: 176). This is in fact Goode’s conclusion in relation to anti-drugs policies more generally in American society, and his words would seem to be equally appropriate as a judgement on anti-doping policy in sport. Goode (1997:4) writes: ‘Our present system of attempting to control drug abuse ... is vulnerable to criticism; it isn't working well, it costs a great deal of money, it has harmful side effects and it is badly in need of repair.’ The specification of required repairs is a central task for policy makers.

These data on drug use also point up the key sociological problem which requires answering before we can properly address policy issues: how do we account for the increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs since the 1960s? This brings us to a consideration of the major sociological approaches to drug use in sport.

ii) Sociological approaches to drug use in sport

In a useful review of work on doping in sport, Lueschen (1993) identified several theoretical approaches to understanding the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport. Amongst these he listed the following:

a) Marxist theory which, he argued, would suggest that the practice of doping is indicative of the alienation of individuals in modern capitalist society. Marxist sociologists he suggests, could identify many structural clues that would illustrate ‘how the athlete as a controlled human being is exploited and alienated, or how sport itself produces alienation’ (1993: 100). Marxist writers on sport such as Brohm (1978) and Rigauer (1981) certainly argued that under capitalism, competitive athletes are simply new types of workers and, as sport becomes just another form of work, so it comes to represent constraint rather than freedom, with the removal of all creative spontaneity (Collins and Waddington, 2000:28); within such a framework, drug use may be seen as a form of alienation of sports workers.

b) Lueschen recommended Merton’s work on social structure and anomie as a theory that has ‘explanatory potential’ in relation to drug use in sport. In his classic analysis, Merton (1957) identified several types of what he called ‘individual adaptation’ to patterns of cultural goals and institutional norms. Merton’s typology of behaviour was based on the identification of culturally prescribed goals and institutionalised (legitimate) means to achieve those goals. Depending on whether people accepted both these culturally defined goals and the institutionalised means to
achieve them, or one but not the other, or neither, he differentiated between behaviours which he described as conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. Lueschen suggested that, within this framework, the use of performance-enhancing drugs can be regarded as innovation, since the drug-using athlete accepts the culturally prescribed goal of winning, but innovates by adopting non-legitimate means to achieve that goal.

c) The theory of differential association developed by Sutherland and Cressy (1974) is seen as useful in that it suggests that the use of performance-enhancing drugs cannot be understood as the behaviour of an isolated individual, for the use of drugs implies not only a network of relationships between users and suppliers, but drug use itself is seen as a process involving learning from, and encouragement by, others.

d) Breivik’s (1987; 1992) use of a variety of two-person models of symmetrical and asymmetrical games is also seen as useful and as raising ‘challenging questions for empirical research’ (Lueshen, 1993:103).

Amongst other, more recent approaches, mention must be made of the two-pronged theory of Coakley and Hughes (1998). They argue, firstly, that the ‘reason drug use has increased so much since the 1950s is not that sports or athletes have changed but that drugs believed and known to enhance physical performance have become so widely available’ (p.168). The so-called ‘pharmacological revolution’ is clearly a process which has to be taken into account in any attempt to explain the increase in drug use; however, in more or less ignoring other social processes associated with changes in the structure of sport and sporting competition, the argument of Coakley and Hughes becomes, in effect, a form of technological determinism, with all the weaknesses associated with such theories (Waddington, 2000:114-119).

The second argument of Coakley and Hughes is that drug use by athletes cannot usefully be conceptualised as negative deviance, that is as deviance involving underconformity to the values of sport; rather, they suggest, it is best conceptualised as positive deviance, for it expresses an overconformity to key values in sport, most notably the value attached to winning.

Three general points can be made about the approaches outlined above. The first is that the sub-discipline within sociology from which most of these frameworks are drawn is not medical sociology, but the sociology of deviance; indeed, the subtitle of Lueschen’s review – the social structure of a deviant subculture - is revealing in this regard. The second point is that some of the above frameworks offer descriptive labels which may be considered more or less useful, but do not provide what might properly be described as explanations. This is particularly relevant to Merton’s work and to aspects of the work of Coakley and Hughes. The characterisation of drug use in sport as either ‘innovation’ or as ‘positive deviance’ may provide us with what may be considered useful descriptive labels but such labels do not significantly help us to understand why athletes engage in the behaviour which is so labelled. The third – and very important – point is that, with the exception of the technological determinist explanation of Coakley and Hughes, all of the above approaches are couched in static terms; in other words they seek to answer the question: why do athletes take drugs? However, the more revealing and sociologically more useful question is: why have athletes over the past four decades increasingly used drugs? This question cannot adequately be answered without adopting a different approach which centres on the changing relationship between sport and medicine. It is here that the perspective of medical sociology has much to offer.
iii) Medical sociological approaches

In the early 1990s, several authors began to draw attention to the importance of understanding the increasingly close relationship between medicine and sport as a basis for understanding drug use in sport. A key text in this regard was Hoberman’s *Mortal Engines*, published in 1992. Hoberman argued that in the early years of this century, ‘sport served the ends of science rather than the other way round’, for sport was seen as just another form of human activity the study of which could aid our understanding of human physiology. In contrast to that earlier period however, ‘the modern outlook sees symbolic importance in the pursuit of the record performance, thereby putting physiology in the service of sport’. This was a critically important insight.

In the same year, Lueschen (1992) - significantly one of the few sociologists working in this area who had also worked in the sociology of medicine - pointed to the importance of the medicalization of society in general as a contextual condition that ‘sets the stage for legitimising the use of drugs in sport’ (p93). Also in 1992, the argument about medicalization was considerably developed by Waddington and Murphy who pointed not only to the medicalization of the wider society as the essential context for understanding doping, but also sought to analyse how, with the development of sports medicine, the medicalization process had encompassed sport itself. Drawing on some key insights in Hoberman’s work, Waddington (1996; 2000) later extended the analysis of the development of sports medicine and its relationship to the development and use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport.

The central objects of this work were (i) to try to account for the increase in the use of performance-enhancing drugs since the 1960s and (ii) to analyse the role of sports physicians in that process. The central thrust of this analysis thus focuses on developments in, and changes in the interrelationships between, medicine and sport. Let us begin by looking briefly at the medicalization of sport.

The medicalization of sport

The medicalization process in society generally has involved growing dependence on professionally provided care and on drugs, the medicalization of prevention and the medicalization of the expectations of lay people regarding health-related issues (Zola, 1972; Illich, 1975). In recent years, the medicalization process has encompassed sport. Central to this process has been the development, particularly since the 1960s, of sports medicine, which is premissed on the idea that highly trained athletes have special medical needs and therefore require special medical supervision.

Two points about the development of sports medicine are of particular significance. Firstly, as Houlihan (1999:88) has noted, the development of sports medicine has been associated with the development of a culture which encourages the treatment not just of injured athletes, but also of healthy athletes, with drugs. Secondly – and of particular significance for the present argument - the relationship between athletes and sports medicine practitioners goes beyond the treatment of sports injuries for, as the British Medical Association's (1996:4) definition of sports medicine indicates, sports medicine is concerned not just with the 'prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of exercise related illnesses and injuries' but also with the 'maximization of performance'. A recent report by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (1999:2) pointed out that ‘it is difficult to draw the borderline between the medicalization of the sportsperson to preserve his/her health and the prescription of drugs to enhance performance’.

14
As the rewards associated with winning have increased, so the role of sports medicine practitioners in maximizing performance has become more important. One consequence of this growing concern of sports physicians with the maximization of performance (Hoberman, 1992) has been to make top-class athletes more and more dependent on increasingly sophisticated systems of medical support in their efforts to run faster, to jump further or higher or to compete more effectively in their chosen sport; indeed, at the highest levels, the quality of medical support may make the difference between success and failure. Brown and Benner (1984:32) for example, have pointed out that, as increased importance has been placed on winning, so athletes:

- have turned to mechanical (exercise, massage), nutritional (vitamins, minerals), psychological (discipline, transcendental meditation), and pharmacological (medicines, drugs) methods to increase their advantage over opponents in competition. A major emphasis has been placed on the nonmedical use of drugs, particularly anabolic steroids, central nervous system stimulants, depressants and analgesics.

The increasing competitiveness of sport
Athletes are not, however, simply unwilling 'victims' of medical imperialism. Several developments in the structure of sporting competition, particularly in the post-Second World War period, have led sportsmen and -women increasingly to turn for help to anyone who can hold out the promise of improving their level of performance. The most important of these developments are probably those which have been associated with the politicization of sport, particularly at the international level, and those which have been associated with massive increases in the rewards - particularly the material rewards - associated with sporting success. Both processes have had the consequence of increasing the competitiveness of sport, one aspect of which has involved the downgrading, in relative terms, of the traditional value associated with taking part whilst greatly increasing the value attached to winning.

In their history of sports in America since 1945 - significantly entitled *Winning is the Only Thing* - Roberts and Olsen (1989: xi-xii) note that, particularly after 1945, Americans 'came to take sports very seriously, and they watched and played for the highest economic, politic, and personal stakes'. Similar changes have occurred elsewhere. In almost all countries, sport is now more competitive and more serious than it used to be. A greater stress is laid upon the importance of winning. Sport is played for higher - sometimes much higher - stakes, whether these be economic, political-national, personal or a combination of all three. This is an important part of the context for understanding the increasing cooperation between athletes and sports physicians in the search for medal winning and record-breaking performances; it is also an important part of the context for understanding the increasing use of drugs in sport.

The sport-medicine axis.
Sports medicine is a legitimate area of specialist practice. There is, however, a substantial and well documented history of the involvement of sports physicians in the development and use of performance-enhancing drugs; note, for example, the central role of Dr John Ziegler, the US team doctor at the 1956 World Games in Moscow, in the development and dissemination among the weightlifting community of the first widely used anabolic steroids; the systematic involvement of doctors in doping in the former East Germany; and the involvement of sports medicine specialists in the development of blood doping (Waddington, 1996).
As long ago as 1988, a leading UK medical journal, *The Lancet*, published an article under the title *Sports medicine - is there lack of control?* It suggested that although ‘evidence of direct involvement of medical practitioners in the procurement and administration of hormones is lacking, their connivance with those who do so is obvious and their participation in blood doping is a matter of record’. It concluded:

Members of the medical profession have long been concerned with the health and welfare of people in sport, but never have the stakes been so high. Evidence continues to grow that some are showing more interest in finding new ways of enhancing the performance of those in their charge than in their physical wellbeing. Surely steps must soon be taken to curb the activities of those few doctors practising on the fringe by bringing sports medicine beneath the umbrella of a recognised body within an accredited programme of professional training (1988:612).

Two years after that *Lancet* editorial, the Dubin Commission of Inquiry in Canada documented the involvement of substantial numbers of sports physicians in providing performance-enhancing drugs to athletes in many sports and in several countries. The Commission found that, in Canada, the ‘names of physicians willing to prescribe anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs circulate widely in gyms’ and that ‘there are physicians in most major centres across the country who have at one time or another been involved in prescribing anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs to athletes’ (Dubin, 1990:357). It noted that the situation in the United States was similar to that in Canada, while evidence provided to the Commission on the situation in Australia indicated that in that country drugs were also readily available from physicians.

If the Dubin Commission marked one watershed in the history of the use of performance-enhancing drugs, then the scandal in the 1998 Tour de France may come to be regarded as a second watershed, particularly in terms of the amount of information that was made available about the systematic and organised use of performance-enhancing drugs in professional cycling and about the pivotal role of team doctors in this process (Waddington, 2000:153-169).

Perhaps not surprisingly, almost all the media coverage of the doping scandal in that Tour was heavily emotive and did little to enhance our understanding of the processes involved. One exception, which brought out particularly clearly the involvement of team doctors, was a piece written for *The Times* by James Waddington, a novelist who is also a cycling fan. Waddington pointed to the enormous physical demands which the Tour makes upon riders and suggested that, in the attempt to keep their team members in the race, team doctors will draw upon an exhaustive knowledge of a range of substances – nutritional, hormonal and anabolic. He continued:

It is a complex regime, with maybe 20 different components … Only the team doctor has this exhaustive knowledge, and thus the average professional cyclist with no scientific background becomes not a partner but a patient. He opens his mouth, holds out his arm, and trusts. That trust, not the reflex shriek of ‘drugs, the excrement of Satan’, should be the crucial point in the whole discussion (*Times*, 25 July, 1998).

One might take issue with Waddington’s characterisation of professional cyclists as passive participants in this process, but he does make a point which is of fundamental importance: *if we*
wished to understand the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport then it is crucial that we understand the centrality of the relationship between elite level athletes and practitioners of sports medicine.

This point was clearly brought out by Cramer in his report on the use of blood doping by the United States cycling team at the 1984 Olympics. After the Olympics it was revealed that most of the American team, which had dominated the cycling events, had been blood doped and, shortly afterwards, the technique was banned by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Cramer (1985:25) wrote:

In the national euphoria after the games, no one thought to pry out any secrets. The US team had won nine medals, dominating the cycling events. ‘Great riders...’ ‘Great coach...’ ‘Great bikes....’ said the press, reporting the daisy chain of back pats. No one thought to add, ‘Great doctors ...’.

iv) Possible areas for further research

Key areas of research within medical sociology include: the behaviour of physicians and medical career structures; the dynamics of doctor/patient relationships; lay referral systems; and the ways in which patients define and make sense of their medical conditions, including their use of medication. All these questions can be asked about the behaviour of doctors and ‘patients’ – that is, athletes – within a sporting context.

a) Physician behaviour and deviant medical careers

We know a good deal about the constraints faced by elite level sportspeople and the ways in which these constraints – particularly the greatly increased importance which has come to be attached to winning - lead many athletes to accept and internalize values associated with a ‘culture of risk’. This involves a generally high level of tolerance of pain and injury and a willingness to ‘play hurt’, ie to continue training and competing with pain and injury and, in many cases, to accept the risks associated with the use of drugs, both licit and illicit (Roderick et al, 2000). What has been much less studied are the constraints on team physicians to deviate from conventionally accepted standards of professional behaviour. To what extent, for example, are team physicians themselves constrained by the greatly increased importance which has come to be attached to winning and by a sporting agenda in which ‘second place doesn’t count’? To what extent do they experience pressure, perhaps not just from the athletes but also from coaches, managers and others, to supply athletes with performance-enhancing drugs? How easy is it to resist such pressures where the prescription of such drugs may mean the difference between winning and losing an important competition which may involve considerable international prestige? To what extent are doctors’ decisions influenced by their knowledge that other competitors will almost certainly be using such drugs? To what extent do doctors themselves understandably wish to be part of a medal-winning or record-breaking team? Is not such participation in a winning team in itself testimony to their professional skill, even if this is used in a way which might generally be considered deviant? In much the same way that it is important not to see the drug-using athlete as an isolated individual, so it is equally important not to see drug-prescribing doctors as isolated individuals, but to examine the everyday constraints on their behaviour and the ways in which these constraints might open up deviant careers within medicine.
It should be emphasized that such a deviant career structure within sports medicine is now firmly established and that it is possible to achieve considerable success within such careers. The Dubin Commission in Canada, for example, noted that Ben Johnson’s physician, Dr Jamie Astaphan, developed considerable expertise in relation to steroid use and that he was consulted by leading athletes from all over the world. It is also clear that this can be a substantial source of income for practitioners who build up large practices among athletes; the Dubin Commission noted that between 1981 and 1988, Dr Ara Artinian, a Toronto general practitioner who supplied athletes with performance-enhancing drugs, purchased anabolic steroids worth $215,101 from pharmaceutical companies (Dubin, 1990: 251; 356).

The issue of deviant medical careers also raises a number of other sociological issues, including those relating to colleague control and professional self-regulation and, of course, socio-legal processes relating to malpractice issues.

b) Doctor-patient relationships
While the basic structure of the relationship between doctor and patient is defined by the fact that the former is an expert and the latter is a lay person, the relationship is also significantly shaped by other processes associated with the relative power and status of the two parties. In the literature on doctor/patient relationships, most emphasis has been placed on the social class and gender dimensions of these relationships; however, there may be special status-related considerations relating to relationships between physicians and athletes.

How, for example, is the relationship between doctor and athlete affected by the fact that, while the doctor may occupy a relatively modest place within the medical profession – sports medicine is, after all, hardly the most long established or most prestigious specialism within medicine - his/her ‘patients’ may be wealthy and world famous athletes? Many sports physicians have a deep personal interest in sport and they may well identify with the work and success of their athlete ‘patients’ to a much greater degree than is the case with their ordinary patients. They may also derive considerable status, pride and a positive self-image from their association with famous athletes. In such a situation, a refusal to supply an athlete with drugs may endanger the continuation of a relationship upon which the doctor places considerable personal value. More generally, these considerations may mean that the doctor has rather less power in the relationship with elite level athletes than is normally the case in relationships between doctors and their patients for within sport the doctor becomes, along with the coach, masseur and others, simply a minor supporting actor to the star players.

c) Lay referral systems
A referral system is a network of relationships within which people consult and obtain information about health-related issues (Freidson, 1960; 1970). In relation to drug use in sport, a central question is: whom do athletes consult, and where and what kind of information do they get, about the use of performance-enhancing drugs? At the elite level, such referral systems may be relatively closed; in his evidence to the Dubin Commission, Dr Astaphan referred to the conspiracy of silence among elite drug-using athletes as the ‘brotherhood of the needle’ (Dubin:336). At this level, the differences between lay and professional referral systems – that is, the differences between professional and lay understandings of drug use – may be relatively small, for the athletes will often be working with physicians who will be their major source of advice.
However, at non-elite levels, physicians appear to be relatively insignificant as sources of advice; a major study of anabolic steroid users in UK gyms found that the major sources of advice are friends (35.8%), anabolic steroid handbooks (25.7%) and dealers (20.2%). There are undoubtedly health risks associated with this pattern of obtaining information; Korkia and Stimson (1993:110-111) noted, for example, that steroid users would sometimes recommend doping practices different from those they used themselves (in order not reveal their 'secret for success') while some men may provide advice to women based on their - the men's - own experiences, which could have serious consequences for female anabolic steroid users in terms of virilising effects. This study also found that ‘the majority of AS [anabolic steroid] users would welcome medical involvement but are unable to get the supervision they would like’. Such data raise important questions about whether we should be moving away from traditional punitive approaches to drug use and towards harm reduction policies involving the provision of specialist medical advice on a confidential and non-judgemental basis.

d) Athletes’ definitions of their drug use.
Those outside the community of drug-using athletes generally hold strongly negative stereotypical images, perhaps fuelled by emotive media coverage, of those who use drugs. But how do athletes themselves perceive and justify their use of drugs? The situation will almost certainly vary from one sport to another, but where those involved in the use of drugs constitute a relatively cohesive community, they may develop a relatively clearly articulated rationale in relation to their use of drugs.

A pertinent study in this regard is Monaghan’s recent (2001) work on bodybuilders. The popular negative stereotyping of bodybuilders as ‘steroid freaks’ subject to ‘roid rage’ is clearly brought in Monaghan’s book, but what is of particular interest are the bodybuilders’ responses to, and their rejection of, these negative stereotypes. Monaghan counterposes what he calls ‘mainstream’ culture with the bodybuilders’ subcultural understandings and background expectancies which, he says, enable them to ‘normalise’ and rationalise activities which others tend to consider as deviant, dangerous and risky. There is, he suggests, ‘a general perception among bodybuilders that they inhabit a community under threat, leading many to engage in discursive stratagems to resist connotations of moral or social odium’ (Monaghan, 2001:26). One such stratagem involves pointing to the deficiencies of ‘bodybuilder’ and ‘bodybuilding’ as descriptive labels, while stressing that their pursuit should be conceived as a process of shaping, refining and sculpting the body rather than simply building size. It would seem that in the case of bodybuilders – and, it might be suspected, in the case of drug-using athletes more generally – the fact that they may form quite tightly knit communities in which drug use is both widely accepted as legitimate and often seen as a prerequisite for success, enables them with some success to reject the hostile stereotyping from the wider society and to sustain their own more positive definition of themselves and their activities. Such issues would repay further study.
References


Sport policy and doping: a research agenda

Barrie Houlihan
Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy
Loughborough University

The status of current research

Although this review is largely confined to research published in English one can feel reasonably confident in claiming that within the social sciences and humanities doping in sport is substantially under-researched. This is particularly true within political science and policy analysis where the volume of research which is informed by scholarship and theory is extremely small. Yet doping in sport generates a wide range of issues and research questions which also connect with some of the most important debates in the broader fields of politics and policy analysis.

A useful starting point for identifying opportunities for research into doping is the conventional distinction drawn between analysis for policy and analysis of policy.

Figure 1: A typology of policy analysis in relation to doping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis for policy</th>
<th>Analysis of policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>Information for policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated, for example, with the rights of athletes, particular penalties for infractions, exclusion of particular drugs etc.</td>
<td>Information regarding the extent of drug use, sources of supply, anti-doping policies in other countries etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Monitoring of the impact of particular policies in relation to aims e.g. youth education, out of competition testing, and the current emphasis on deterrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the policy process</td>
<td>How do doping issues reach the policy agenda; how are they defined; identification of constraints on action etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of policy content</td>
<td>Designed to identify the origins, aims and/or operation of specific policies e.g. out of competition testing, appeals procedure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Gordon et al 1997

Academic research has an important and legitimate role to play in all the types of policy analysis identified in Figure 1 with the possible exception of policy advocacy. Advocacy is more closely associated with the activities of interest groups rather than academic research though it is possible to argue that the liberal ethos of universities makes certain advocacy positions, relating to the protection of particular rights, an appropriate focus for research. However, when academics become involved in ‘analysis for policy’ it is more frequently in the capacity of a contractor or consultant to government where the objective is the provision of
policy-oriented information. Often the initiative for this type of research comes from the relevant government department or agency, but there are opportunities for academics to market proposals for research to potential clients. The extent and type of drug use, different patterns of use between sports or different levels of performance within the same sport, the sources of supply and the attitudes of users, coaches, doctors and the public all remain seriously under-researched.

A similarly entrepreneurial attitude by academics may produce research funding in relation to the third type of policy analysis which is concerned with monitoring and evaluation of existing policy. Monitoring involves the collection of data on which evaluation can be based, but most monitoring in doping is of outputs rather than outcomes. For example, data is available on the number of tests conducted, the investment in scientific research, the number of doping control officers trained and the number of conferences attended, but there is very little data on the impact or outcome of policy, whether, for example, drug use is declining. The fourth type of policy analysis, the analysis of the policy process, places the emphasis on inputs and the transformational processes involved in the making of public policy with the audience for this type of research being primarily, but not exclusively, academic. The conceptual and theoretical richness of this type of research has grown immensely over the last ten years and is discussed more thoroughly below. Finally, there is the analysis of policy content where the aim is to identify the origins, objectives and/or operation of specific policies, for example out-of-competition testing, the tribunal/court of arbitration system, the domestic funding of anti-doping policy etc.

Most existing research can be grouped within the five categories identified in Figure 1 although with some important sub-divisions within each category. There are a number of studies that cluster in the ‘analysis for policy’ category often combining advocacy and the provision of information for policy-makers. First, there are a number of official reports and inquiries, which often contain valuable raw data and some analysis (Dubin 1990, Australia 1989, World Health Organisation 1993). Second, there are the investigations either in the form of ‘insider accounts’ or the product of investigative journalism. Voy’s (1991) account of his time as medical officer to the United States Olympic Committee which combines exposé with advocacy is one of the best and most interesting examples. However, the investigation of doping in the former German Democratic Republic by Franke and Berendonke (1997; see also Berendonke 1992) is also a powerful indictment of governmental abuse of sport. Other studies of note include those by Donohoe and Johnson (1986), Goldman and Klatz (1992), Reiterer (2000) and Verroken (1996 & 2000). There has been a spate of books by those involved in the 1998 Tour de France debacle with Voets (2001) among the more interesting although it needs to be treated with caution for obvious reasons (others include Guillon & Quenet 1999 & 2000; Lhomme 2000; Baal 1999).

There are few social science studies concerned with the monitoring and evaluation of policy partly because anti-doping policy has been so unstable. Tarasti’s review of cases that reached the Court of Arbitration for Sport is one of the exceptions and, while rich in detail, the focus is narrow (2000). There is, however, a substantial body of analysis in the related area of social drug use where the longer history of policy instruments has produced a number of valuable evaluations of strategies based on the attempt to control supply or to reduce demand (see for example Smith 1992, Lart 1992; Dorn et al 1996; Hough 1996).
There is very little research that explicitly aims to provide an analysis of the policy process for doping and which is informed by the theory and concepts of policy analysis (see for example the edited work by Wilson and Derse, 2001 and Houlihan 1999a, b, c, 2000, 2001a, b, c, d). However, as Figure 2 shows there are many excellent studies from within the social sciences and humanities that provide insights into the policy process as a by-product of their main concern or perspective.

**Figure 2: Doping policy analysis and the contributions from the social sciences and humanities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th>Political science</th>
<th>Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>Political science</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Social policy (social drug use)</td>
<td>Sociology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Constructing a research agenda

The limited research within political science in general and policy analysis in particular is both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand there is the luxury of having a wide range of topics for research, but on the other there is often a lack of awareness among other political scientists of the issues and concerns that are raised by research into doping policy or of the contribution that the research can make to broader concerns within political science. However, on a more positive note the lack of a substantial community of researchers in any particular country provides encouragement for the development of international links and thereby enriches the empirical base and theoretical context for research.

Themes for future research can be grouped in a number of ways, for example according to sub-disciplines within political science (political philosophy, policy analysis, public administration/sector management, international relations etc.), hierarchically (national or international level focus) or according to a model of the policy process (the Eastonian systems model or some variation on the rational model). The analysis of research themes which follows is organised by level of focus and by stages of the policy process.

Despite the boundary between domestic and international policy-making becoming increasingly blurred for the purposes of this paper research themes will be grouped loosely under two broad headings – national and international/global with each theme linking to established literature in a range of political science fields.

National level research themes

Note. Many of the themes identified below can be explored either within a national context or on the basis of comparative research.

Research theme 1.1: Conceptualisations of the policy process for doping

The long established dominance of the policy community/network conceptualisation of the policy process has come under substantial challenge in recent years from those critical of the failure of the conceptualisation to capture the dynamism of policy and the subtlety of the policy process (John 1998; Sabatier 1999). There is a particularly strong case for exploring alternative formulations of the policy process with regard to doping in particular but also sports policy-making in general. Doping policy is often ‘made’ at the point where more firmly entrenched policy communities meet, such as those for health or law and order, or else is a by-product of already established policies targeted at some related social issue. A series of research questions arise:

- is there a stable policy network or even policy community for anti-doping policy?
- if there is, how does it differ from the networks/communities found in other policy areas?
- how does it differ from networks/communities found in other countries?
- who are the key actors in the network/community
- what role does the state play and how is state influence manifest
- what role is played by professional interests such as doctors, sports scientists, coaches etc and is there the basis for an epistemic community?
if the policy-making process is to be conceptualised as a community what values bind its members?
if the policy network/community metaphor is inadequate what alternative conceptualisations might have greater explanatory power?

The punctuated equilibrium theory of Baumgartner and Jones (1991; see also True et al 1999) offers the prospect of explaining, more effectively, the dynamics of policy while the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994) would appear to take account, more satisfactorily, of the lack of coherence among policy actors and the existence of clusters of interests.

Research theme 1.2: Agenda setting, policy definition and policy objectives
Following on from theme 1.1 the question of the distribution and articulation of power in the sport policy area is still under-researched. Nowhere is the absence of research more noticeable than in connection with doping policy at the domestic level. Indeed it may be the case that the internationalisation of the policy response to doping is a convenient and welcome diversion from the ambiguity of policy-making within the national arena. In some countries national level doping policy remains a fiercely contested issue and in others an example of the non-decision-making described by Crenson (1971) and as such would benefit from analysis informed by the well established work of Lukes (1974), Gaventa (1980), Bachrach & Baratz (1970) and the Gramscian school of hegemony theorists typified by the work of Habermas (1989) and, in relation to sport, that of Hargreaves (1986). More recently, the work of discourse theorists has added to the analytical tools available to the researcher interested in the ‘management of meaning’ and its significance for the transformation of private issues into public policy problems (see for example Fischer & Forester, 1993). There has been very little, if any, analysis of the process of agenda-setting regarding doping.

What are the competing coalitions, what are their interests, how is power exercised and with what effect?
Is it possible to distinguish between symbolic and substantive objectives of many supporters of drug-free sport?
Over the last ten years or so has the loose collection of anti-doping interests combined to form an effective advocacy coalition capable of withstanding the often eccentric interventions of individual policy actors such as the enthusiastic or opportunistic politician or television executive?

Other questions may be asked with regard to the way in which the issue of doping is defined once it is recognised as a public issue.

What is the process by which the issue is variously defined as one of public health, law and order, education and public information, or diplomacy etc.
What factors determine the objectives of policy? Harm reduction, use reduction, drug-free sport are among the many possible policy objectives, but little is known about the process by which they are identified and the extent to which overt and covert objectives co-exist.
Research theme 1.3: The public administration of doping policy

Public administration as a field of study has gone out of fashion in a number of countries, but whether the field is defined as new public management or public administration there are a number of interesting areas for research.

- In which branch of government is responsibility for doping policy located and with what effect?
- What is the nature of the administrative culture that provides the context for policy?

In the UK, for example, the responsibility for anti-doping policy is located in the same agency, UK Sport, that is responsible for ensuring elite success and the attraction of world class events to the UK. Such arrangements would benefit from an analysis of ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy’ (Hall 1986: 19). Hall and other ‘new institutionalists’ emphasise the extent to which organisations affect the formulation of policy. The ideas and values of policy actors are not seen as exogenous variables but a factor which is situationally affected, if not determined. As Hall notes ‘ideas acquire force when they find organisational means of expression’ (1986: 280). The interaction between structure and agency allows an exploration of the impact of administrative/organisational arrangements on the character of anti-doping policy, both as independent sources of policy ‘traditions’ and as a mediator of the policy intentions of other actors.

- What is the impact on policy of the location of responsibility for anti-doping policy at federal/central government level or at provincial/regional level, with the independent sports confederation, with a particular government department or with a semi-independent agency?

A related topic for research concerns the implementation of policy. Too often the focus of attention in policy analysis is on input and output processes such as how doping issues get on to the political agenda and what type of policy outputs (laws, funding etc.) are produced.

- How is anti-doping policy implemented?

In addition to the prescriptive rational model of implementation the vigorous debates concerning implementation failure and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to provide opportunities for research. The general acceptance that ‘policy is being made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made’ (Anderson 1975: 98) draws attention to an analysis of the behaviour at the ‘street level’ (Lipsky 1976 & 1979).

- How are decisions made about who to test, when to test, how often to test, how to determine whether a positive laboratory result constitutes a doping infraction and how to interpret the evidence at disciplinary hearings are among the many opportunities for ‘street level’ anti-doping policy-making.

Although these aspects of policy-making are hard to investigate they are of considerable importance. There is a rich, if neglected, literature that discusses administrative discretion (Hill 1969; Dunsire 1978; Linder and Guy Peters 1987), administration as a form of game (Bardach
1977; Morgan 1986), as a process of mutual adaptation (Browne & Wildavsky 1984), and as a process of evolution (Majone & Wildavsky 1978).

Research theme 1.4: Policy instruments
Conventionally, policy instruments fall into one of three categories – incentives/inducements, sanctions/threats, and information/education. Anti-doping policy is heavily reliant on sanctions almost to the exclusion of other instruments although there is some evidence of an increased interest in education.

- How is the choice of policy instruments made?

There is much valuable research into the effectiveness of the instruments selected to tackle social drug use which could be used as a starting point. See the references listed under social policy in Figure 1 and see also the recent editorial in Addiction (2001) which has the provocative title ‘Why does research have so little impact on American drug policy?’.

Table 1 provides a schematic analysis of the relationship between possible causes of doping and the likely effectiveness of particular policy instruments.

Table 1: The causes of non-compliance with anti-doping regulations among adult athletes, the range of policy instruments available and their likely success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy instruments</th>
<th>Rewards (e.g. money and public honours)</th>
<th>Information/education (e.g. on banned substances and practices, and also on the health effects of sustained use)</th>
<th>Erection of barriers (e.g. control of the supply of drugs)</th>
<th>Deterrents (e.g. extensive testing, fines and periods of suspension from competition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance or incompetence</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Substantial potential effect</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to comply (lack of free will)</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscious decision not to comply</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate to substantial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 takes as its focus the causes of non-compliance among adult athletes. Within the UK context, and indeed internationally since the collapse of communism in central Europe, few athletes could claim that they were prevented from complying, despite the fact that some athletes argue that they are under considerable pressure from their entourage and from their peers to take drugs. In the cases where athletes lack the freedom to make choices policies that are directed at individual athletes are unlikely to be successful. Ignorance or incompetence are
more plausible causes of non-compliance given the complexity of the IOC list of banned substances and practices, the fact that it changes annually, and the varying levels of sophistication among athletes. It is in this area that the provision of information and the establishment of education programmes would be most effective. Finally, where anti-doping agencies are faced by athletes who decide not to comply, which is likely to be the largest group of non-compliers in the UK and most democratic countries, then a combination of policies might be employed designed to restrict supply, deter use through the extent and effectiveness of the testing programme, and provide information on the effects of long term use of drugs.

Even taking one target group produces a fairly complex pattern of possible policies. The complexity is compounded when the adult group is disaggregated by sport or gender for example, and when additional targets groups are considered such as young athletes (minors), coaches and other members of the athlete’s entourage, and national governing bodies.

- It would be possible to rework Table 1 for each of these groups (minors, members of the athlete’s entourage, different sports) thus producing a series of bespoke policy responses.

For example, while few adult athletes could claim to be unable to comply this is a much more plausible cause of non-compliance among minors. The importance of young people as a target group for policy is evident from a recent Sport England survey of twelve sports which showed that the average age at which athletes entered sport at the performance level (serious competition) was 11 years 6 months and that on average athletes in six sports, women’s and men’s judo, swimming, netball, women’s hockey and sailing, moved to elite level competition before the age of eighteen.

- Neither the basis of selection of instruments or combination of instruments nor their effectiveness has received serious academic attention. Research in this area is long overdue.

There is a rich literature in this area including Bemelmans-Videc et al 1998; Bressers & Klok 1988; Nagel 1988; Howlett 1991; and Linder & Guy Peters 1989.

**Research theme 1.5: The role of the domestic legal system.**

Although this topic could be included under theme 1.4 it is worth identifying separately as the courts have played and continue to play a crucial role in shaping policy at the national (and also international) level. In most countries, and even within the European Union, courts acknowledge the particular characteristics of sport and have often been reluctant to become involved in what they consider to be private matters. Courts are becoming increasingly involved in sports-related cases and have played, and will continue to play, a particularly important role in doping cases. However, the response of the domestic courts in the UK, Germany and the United States to appeals by athletes against the decisions of their governing body has been inconsistent.

- Research questions include the integration of the courts into the fabric of anti-doping policy and the relationship between the arbitration processes of national and international federations and the courts.
**International research themes**

**Research theme 2.1: Theorising the international policy process.**

While it is acknowledged that it is increasingly difficult to isolate domestic anti-doping policy from international policy processes it is still useful to treat international policy-making separately for the time being at least as it has developed a distinctive conceptual language and body of theory. Perhaps the most useful concept is that of the policy regime which Krasner defines as ‘sets of explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations.’ (1983: 2). Regime analysis provides a rich body of theory for examining the process of international policy making in general and the role and significance of the World Anti-Doping Agency in particular.

Neo-liberal theory in international relations focuses on interests and suggests that ‘self-interested parties [endeavour] to co-ordinate their behaviour to reap joint gains’ (Young and Osherenko 1993a: 249) and that actors are ‘strategically rational but otherwise mutually indifferent’ (Hasenclever et al 1997: 26) thus producing co-operation in the formation of regimes on a strictly limited basis, usually as a means for overcoming market failure and where the anticipated outcome is a positive sum position for all states involved (Keohane 1984 & 1989). The perspective is well summarised by Krasner who argues that ‘The success or failure of regime-building can be explained by the extent to which regimes provide information, monitoring capabilities, or focal points that allow states to move towards the Pareto frontier; everyone better off at the same time; absolute rather than relative gains matter’ (1993: 139).

- Policy actors benefit from participation in regimes in a number of ways including the reduction of uncertainty through the provision of information about rivals and a reduction in the cost of gathering information; the provision of a greater degree of continuity, stability and predictability about other actors’ behaviour; and an increase in the cost of non-compliance due to the damage to reputation and thus the risk of ‘forfeit[ing] potential future gains from co-operation’ (Hasenclever et al 1997: 36; see also Keohane 1984 & 1989).
- Are these benefits currently evident in relation to anti-doping policy.

The neo-liberal emphasis on interests and the desire to reduce uncertainty is often coupled with a recognition that resource constraints are an important prompt for states to seek solutions through co-operation. The regime is consequently seen as a network or arena for issue discussion and definition, and also often for policy implementation by providing incentives for compliance. Regimes therefore provide an opportunity to overcome resource dependencies. Conversely deepening resource dependencies provide an important factor in explaining the formation and persistence of regimes (Haggard & Simmons 1987; Young & Osherenko 1993b).

Neo-liberalism directs attention to the gradual development and strengthening of international agreements on doping and links between states that took place during the 1990s and also the growing awareness of the resource costs of an effective policy response and, as such, would appear to provide a useful explanatory framework. The involvement of the Council of Europe and more recently that of the European Union can be fruitfully illuminated by neo-liberal theory as can the growing density of bi/mini/multi-lateral agreements between states.
How have recent changes in the pattern of resource dependency between governments and international sports organisations affected policy?

In what way have states recalculated their interests in relation to doping?

An alternative perspective is offered by the realist school which suggests that regime creation is the result of the distribution of power and the calculation of self-interest by states and offers a forceful alternative explanation for regime formation (Grieco 1988 & 1990). For the more powerful states the motive is to establish, extend and reinforce competitive advantage while for weaker states the acceptance of international obligations is the result of compulsion. Recent trends in swimming provide some supporting evidence for this view. Both the United States and Australia have for some time seen themselves as major swimming powers. When in the mid 1990s Chinese female swimmers began to move rapidly up the world rankings, win medals and break world records the swimming federations in both the USA and Australia first expressed scepticism at this dramatic improvement and then voiced open allegations of doping. The motivation was not just outrage at cheating or at the loss of status although both were important, the motive was also financial as the funding for both federations from their respective national Olympic committees was derived from a formula based on their level of international success. An effective anti-doping regime was attractive as a means of controlling the diminishing but still significant number of subversive states.

The ideational/weak cognitivist perspective has the potential to complement realist and neo-liberal explanation of regime formation by exploring the significance of ideas in shaping regimes and the behaviour of actors. Nadelmann, in his study of global prohibition regimes, argues persuasively that ‘moral and emotional factors related neither to political nor economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments ... conscience, paternalism, fear, prejudice and the compulsion to proselytise can and do play important roles in the creation and the evolution of international regimes’ (1990: 480). Ideational explanations of regime formation tend to take one of two forms, the first emphasises the role of epistemic communities and the second the significance of ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ (Nadelmann 1990: 480). Haas defines an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular ... issue area’ (1992: 3). Due to their control over the important resource of knowledge and the dependence of other policy actors on knowledge to reduce uncertainty epistemic communities have the potential to influence the way issues are framed and solutions selected. Doping is an international issue about which there is substantial uncertainty, where individual states are weak, and where there is considerable technical complexity – in short, an issue where there is substantial scope for the formation of an epistemic community around the growing cadre of scientists, sports medicine specialists and doping control administrators. However, as has been argued elsewhere the potential members of the epistemic community are, currently at least, too closely tied to the interests of their employers, government anti-doping agency or international federation doping control unit to constitute an effective independent voice (Houlihan 1999a).

It is difficult to identify clear equivalents to Nadelman’s ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ in the area of doping.

Are there any organisations that correspond to Nadelman’s ‘moral entrepreneurs’ in doping policy? Are there any organisations that carry the moral authority of Amnesty International,
Greenpeace, or Oxfam and have had a similar impact in mobilising popular opinion and political support?

The Council of Europe might perhaps lay claim to the role as its opposition to doping is complemented by its ethical stand on racism and intolerance in sport, but its international profile is low even within Europe. OATH, an international organisation campaigning under the slogan ‘integrity in and through sport’ grew out of the 1998 corruption scandal surrounding the IOC and takes a clear anti-doping position. However, it was poorly resourced and struggled to sustain an international profile.

Neo-liberal, realist and cognitivist theory provide a sophisticated range of perspectives from which to address questions such as the faltering pace of policy development; the recent interest of the European Union in doping, the shift within the United States from apathy to activism, and the prospects for the success of WADA.

Research theme 2.2: Globalisation and doping.
An approach, complementary to that discussed in 2.1, to an analysis of doping policy is to locate the analysis within the current debates on globalisation. The initial naive theorising of globalisation has given way to a more reflective approach which provides interesting opportunities to investigate progress towards a global consensus (harmonisation) on doping policy. First, doping policy can be examined in terms of the cultural values and norms that it embodies. Table 2 suggests in schematic form a possible analysis of the cultural content of doping policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>deep structure</th>
<th>actions of the state</th>
<th>commodities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>beliefs about the relationship between genders and generations, perceptions of gender roles and ‘femaleness’: gender verification.</td>
<td>legislation/ regulation: for example, regarding the protection of children/minors involved in sport; and the criminalisation of possession, sale &amp;/or use of particular drugs.</td>
<td>anti-doping publicity campaigns and educational programmes by federations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>beliefs about the limits on the power of the state and rights of the individual e.g. the reluctance of courts to become involved in sports disputes, and the right of athletes to take risks with their health.</td>
<td>administrative structures for implementation of anti-doping policy: pressure applied to domestic federations to comply with policy.</td>
<td>political posturing: including the attendance of politicians at anti-doping conferences, and dual messages to federations such as ‘win medals but not with drugs, but fail to win medals and we will cut your funding’; also ritual attacks on the IOC and IFs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>beliefs about profit and corporate responsibility/ freedom (of drug companies, for example)</td>
<td>extent of public funding of anti-doping activity; regulation of sports sponsorship.</td>
<td>marketing of supplements and the covert advertising and distribution of drugs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Houlihan 2001a
A number of interesting research questions arise from treating attempts to establish a global anti-doping policy as a cultural product. Most importantly:

- what values and whose values are reflected in anti-doping policy?
- are WADA’s efforts to establish a global set of norms and values on doping (similar to those established regarding human rights) a reflection of a western view of sport
- or are the efforts better understood as a reaction to the ‘devaluing’ of the marketability of the Olympic Games because too many medals are being won by athletes from outside the main lucrative television markets.

If drug-free sport were achievable it would be the richer countries that would benefit because of their access to other more expensive and sophisticated forms of technological and scientific advantage.

A further aspect of the relationship between doping and globalisation is the opportunities it provides to examine the role of the state. While many studies of globalisation exhibit a quite proper concern with investigating the extent to which the deep structure of culture is affected by sports globalisation too many focus on the more shallow marketplace of cultural commodities. However, both generally fail to give significant consideration to the role of the state or the role of international governmental organisations. All too often sports globalisation theory is ‘state-free’ theory with the state treated as being marginal to globalisation processes or at least ineffective in influencing the character of these processes. While the media is given centre stage as the primary vehicle of globalisation and international sports organisations such as the IOC and international federations are afforded an important secondary role the state is rarely discussed. A useful starting point for exploring the role of the state in the construction of global anti-doping policy is the ideal typology outlined in Table 2 which is adapted from Hirst and Thompson (1999) who argue for the need to inject far more rigour into the theorising of globalisation and for the need to distinguish between various outcomes from the process of globalisation. Hirst and Thompson distinguish, in an ideal typical fashion, between an international and a globalised economy. In general the international economy is one where there is the ‘continued relative separation of the domestic and the international frameworks for policy-making and the management of economic affairs, and also a relative separation of economic effects’. By contrast in a globalised economy distinct national economies are subsumed within an economy which is ‘autonomized and socially disembedded’ thus making governance and the imposition of distinct patterns of domestic regulation ‘fundamentally problematic’. Stateless corporations exemplify the existence of genuinely rootless and fluid capital which gains power at the expense of national governments in what is essentially a zero-sum game. An adaptation of this typology to anti-doping policy is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Globalised and internationalised anti-doping policy, and the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Globalised anti-doping policy</th>
<th>Internationalised anti-doping policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation as the defining unit of policy-making on doping</td>
<td>Transnational anti-doping policy which reflects the rootless character of much international sport.</td>
<td>International anti-doping policy the product of the aggregation of proximate national policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of global diversity in policy</td>
<td>Diminishing diversity and/or the overlaying of regionally/ nationally distinctive anti-doping policy with an increasingly uniform pattern of policy processes and objectives.</td>
<td>Maintenance of a vigorous national/regional policy identity where policy is tailored to the particular mix of circumstances (sports, culture, wealth etc.) found in individual states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of state involvement in policy-making</td>
<td>Minimal state involvement. Policy is imposed (or accepted) as an external product.</td>
<td>Substantial state involvement. Anti-doping policy relies heavily on state resources, especially finance, legislation and organisational capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which domestic sports federations/governing bodies operate within a national framework of regulation</td>
<td>Regulation by the international federations or IOC.</td>
<td>National framework of regulation and domestic law/constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which international anti-doping ‘agencies’ such as WADA, IOC and IFs are subject to domestic control</td>
<td>Immune from domestic regulatory and legal systems or located in countries where the legal system is ‘protective’ of corporate/organisational interests.</td>
<td>Subject to legal challenge or state oversight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary issue for research that arises from Table 3 is the role of the state in shaping the international policy response to doping.

- What are the state’s motives?
- How successful is the state in adapting to a globalised policy environment for doping?

The establishment of the International Intergovernmental Consultative Group on Anti-Doping in Sports (IIGCADS), WADA, the activism of the EU, and the development of bi/mini/multi-lateral agreements are all examples of the adaptability of the state that require closer examination.

**Research theme 2.3: Comparative research**

Although many of the research themes identified above could be placed in a comparative framework it is worth emphasising the need and value of sustained comparative research in the area of doping. Such research would not only have value for those interested in the analysis of policy but also those who are interested in analysis for policy. Among the many questions that would benefit from comparative research are the following:
what is the relationship between governments or their anti-doping agencies and domestic federations?
what is the pattern of resource dependence between them?
how can the differences between sports in their approach to the issue of doping be explained?
what accounts for the different levels of international activism of governments and international federations?
are there significantly different patterns of drug use between countries?
what non-sanction based anti-doping strategies are being developed in different sports or countries and have they been evaluated?

Research theme 2.4: The role of the European Union
The gradual assumption of a role in general sport policy by the EU is still substantially under-researched and the recent increasingly vocal role in anti-doping policy has received very little attention. There is considerable scope for research into the role of the EU at the global level as mentioned in theme 2.2 and also into its interaction with the anti-doping authorities of its member states.

- What are the motives of the EU?
- What resources can it bring to the problem?
- How will it develop links with international federations and the IOC and how is the activism of the EU perceived by other policy actors?
- What is the impact of the EU on WADA?
- See other questions, especially those in sections 2.2 and 2.4.

Research theme 2.5: Compliance, enforcement, co-ordination, and harmonisation
The current priority of WADA, the EU and the Council of Europe is harmonisation of policy. A number of issues for research arise including:

- the ambiguity of the concept of harmonisation,
- the process for achieving harmonisation,
- and the monitoring of compliance.

In addition, little detail is available about:
- the causes of non-compliance among states and international federations

There is also an under-explored debate about:
- the appropriateness of harmonisation of penalties such as a minimum two year suspension from competition for steroid use.
- does a uniform period of suspension take sufficient account of the differences between sports, for example in terms of the variable career lengths of athletes, whether the sport is commercial/professional or not, and the level at which the sport is played?

Table 4 identifies different definitions of harmonisation and links the intended outcome with an analysis of probable process. In terms of outcomes the concept of harmonisation is used with increasing frequency in anti-doping forums but with little attempt to define its meaning.
Treating harmonisation as an outcome is it appropriate to distinguish between technical uniformity, proximity, compatibility, and value consensus as in Table 4?

Treating harmonisation as a process is it useful to distinguish between collective negotiation, external imposition, and self-regulation?

**Table 4: Harmonisation: outcomes and process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Key relationships and process of harmonisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical uniformity</strong></td>
<td>Urine sample collection, transport and analysis</td>
<td>Impostion: IOC &amp; accredited laboratories ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>List of banned substances and practices</td>
<td>Impostion: IFs &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impostion: Gov &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impostion: IFs &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximity</strong></td>
<td>List of banned substances and practices</td>
<td>Impostion: IOC &amp; Olympic IFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impostion: Gov &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proximity</strong></td>
<td>Extent of testing</td>
<td>Impostion: IFs &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impostion: Gov &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compat-ibility</strong></td>
<td>Transfer of banned athletes</td>
<td>Impostion: IFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consensus</strong></td>
<td>Individual rights (procedural justice)</td>
<td>Impostion: IFs &amp; DFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consensus</strong></td>
<td>Underpinning policy values</td>
<td>Impostion: Gov &amp; IFs ------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consensus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impostion: IOC/CE/WADA &amp; IFs ------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
- CE = Council of Europe
- DFs = domestic federations
- Gov = government/anti-doping agency
- IFs = international federations
- IOC = International Olympic Committee
- WADA = World Anti-Doping Agency

Technical uniformity is a form of harmonisation most clearly applicable to the process of urine sample collection, transport and analysis. In recent years there have been a number of successful appeals by athletes based on flaws in the handling or the laboratory analysis of samples. As a
result the process by which laboratories are accredited and reaccredited by the IOC became steadily more rigorous, and the specification of the sample collection process and the training of doping control officers has become increasingly detailed, and in some cases subject to ISO standards. The relationship between the IOC, as the accrediting body, and the laboratories is central with other important relationships including those between each IF and its domestic affiliates and between the government anti-doping agency (should there be one) and the domestic federations. The IAAF, in conjunction with the IOC, has prepared a detailed set of guidelines regarding the procedure for sample collection and transport which government agencies are generally content to adhere to and use their resources to enforce.

Proximity best describes the harmonisation of lists of banned substances and practices across different sports. Although most international federations have adopted the IOC list of banned substances and practices uniformity is absent for two reasons. The first reason is that some federations have taken the positive decision to vary the IOC list in order to take account of the particular characteristics of their sport. For example beta-blockers are not banned in basketball whereas alcohol is banned in motor sports (Vrijman, 1995). The second reason for variation in lists between federations is that some federations fail to alter the list specified in their rules to take account of the publication of revised lists by the IOC. However, the extent of variation is minimal and a high degree of proximity to the IOC standard is achieved across the world’s fifty or so major sports (Vrijman, 1995, pp. 15 -18). With regard to individual sports the IFs will impose a uniform list on their domestic federations and as such this relationship is one which fits more closely in the previous category of technical uniformity. However, harmonisation between sports involves relationships between the IOC and the Olympic (and non-Olympic) IFs, and between government anti-doping agencies and domestic sports federations. In both these relationships the underpinning resource dependency is weaker and consequently harmonisation relies much more heavily on negotiation, although where governments are involved financial sanctions or inducements are often applied.

Harmonisation, defined as proximity, would also be an appropriate objective regarding the number/proportion of athletes to be tested, the frequency of testing, the testing of junior athletes, and the position in the ranking list where testing should begin. With regard to many of these elements of anti-doping policy uniformity would be hard to achieve even if it were considered desirable. Such is the degree of variation, even within one sport, in terms of the composition and strength of a squad, and such is also the variation in the resources of domestic federations and governments that proximity of policy within agreed bounds of tolerance regarding under-compliance is a more realistic objective. However, it is worth noting that the bounds of tolerance are rarely explicit and that informal mechanisms are used to achieve an acceptable degree of consistency in behaviour. Negotiations between government agencies and domestic federations are becoming increasingly central with the agencies using a combination of inducements (e.g. offers to cover the cost of tests) and sanctions (exclusion from agency advisory services and withdrawal of funding). For the professional and commercially successful sports such as tennis, golf, soccer and rugby their resource dependence on government is low and, as a result, they are often slow to enter into negotiations with government. Few western democracies have the power possessed by the French government to exclude a sport from competition should it fail to satisfy the expectations of the anti-doping authority.
Compatibility differs from proximity in terms of the basis on which variation is allowed insofar as variation is acceptable up to the point where the procedures/policies adopted by the various actors come into conflict with the broad goals of anti-doping policy. For example, it is accepted that it is incompatible with broad policy goals for federation 'A' to allow an athlete banned by federation 'B' for a doping infraction to transfer to the sport controlled by federation 'A', for example from rugby union to rugby league or from Australian rules football to Gaelic football. In this example of harmonisation defined as compatibility there is a substantial degree of self-regulation involved reflecting the extent to which the prevention of transfers by athletes punished for doping is perceived as being in the mutual interest of most federations. Despite the problems that would be caused by a banned athlete seeking to change sports and federations in order to continue competing (and earning) only five federations out of fifty-four have written into their regulations that they will recognise the sanctions imposed by other federations (Vrijman, 1995, p. 37).

The final interpretation of harmonisation is value consensus and concerns, at one level, those aspects of doping policy that impinge on athlete's rights, and include, for example, the acceptance of values such as a 'right to a hearing', the impartiality of those sitting in judgement, the disclosure of evidence, and the right to an appeal. In a recent review of the anti-doping regulations of over fifty major international federations it was apparent that the incorporation of elements of natural justice into federation regulations was one of the weakest areas of policy making. Thirty-three out of a total of fifty-four federations did not include the right to a hearing in their regulations (Vrijman, 1995, p. 37). At another level value consensus might also be used to describe the stage of policy development where the values underpinning the objectives of anti-doping are taken for granted by key actors to the extent that the precise specification of policy is no longer essential and where a high level of harmonisation is achieved with a minimum of external monitoring and policing. At this stage in regime development this is largely policy as aspiration!

**Research theme 2.6: WADA.**

The formation of WADA is one of the most significant developments in anti-doping policy and overlaps with many of the themes already discussed. In addition to those research questions already identified there are a number of distinctive aspects of the Agency that deserve investigation.

- First, there is the rare character of the regime. Most regimes are state-centred, a smaller number are private regimes (banking/insurance) but very few are a combination.
- Second, as WADA becomes more firmly established how will its relationship with governments and IFs/IOC develop?
- What will be the pattern of resource dependencies that will give substance to the current momentum?
- What combination of power and authority will WADA seek to establish?
- By what criteria should we evaluate the success of WADA?

The establishment of WADA also highlights some of the general problems arising from the internationalisation of policy-making and issues such as governance, stakeholding, and democratic deficit. Consideration of governance has intensified in recent years in an attempt to aid understanding of the steady erosion of the traditional bases of political power in advanced
industrial democracies. Policy processes are affected by increasing complexity and by the steady leakage of power from states up to transnational institutions such as WADA and the EU, out to private organisations (IFs and pharmaceutical companies) and, in some cases, down to individual powerful domestic sports federations or clubs. Yet the concept of governance is highly ambiguous and has multiple overlapping meanings. Rhodes (1996), for example, has identified six uses of the term governance and Hirst has (2000) identified five. Among the variety of uses of the term there are two that are of particular relevance to current research namely, governance as the process of ‘steering’ policy-making and as a normative framework of ‘good governance’.

Governance as steering is, according to Jessop, the ‘complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence’ (1997: 95). Globalisation has added to the growing functional differentiation of modern society with the result that it has become increasingly difficult to maintain established patterns of ‘hierarchical, top-down co-ordination’ (Jessop 1995: 324). For Rhodes steering is undertaken by the state, albeit ‘indirectly and imperfectly’ (1996: 660). There are a number of questions that arise from the acceptance of the notion of state steering in relation to anti-doping policy:

- first, how convincing is the evidence of the state’s capacity to steer effectively especially in an increasingly internationalised/ globalised policy environment?
- second, if the state is capable of steering then is it a capacity shared by all states or only by some and does an increasingly globalised policy environment affect all states equally?
- third, towards which objectives can the state effectively steer or as Pierre and Peters put it ‘who defines the objectives of governance’ (2000: 23)?
- and finally, when does steering become co-ordination, brokering, mediating or some other relationship predicated on notions of resource dependency?

The second use of the term is as ‘good governance’ and has itself two overlapping definitions. First, there is good governance as understood as ‘best practice’ in ethical organisation and treats the way in which relationships between the organisation and its primary and secondary stakeholders is arranged as central (LeBlanc 1999; Clarkson 1995; Donaldson & Preston 1995). Primary stakeholding groups are those without whose continuing participation the organisation would not survive and might include athletes, sponsors, broadcasters and governments. Secondary stakeholders are those groups who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the organisation, but which are not essential for its survival and in sport might include the supporters/fans, facility owners and municipalities. An organisation may consequently be defined as a system of primary stakeholder groups in a complex pattern of relationships comprising rights, resources, objectives and responsibilities. Good governance may therefore be achieved through ensuring that stakeholder groups or their advocates are capable of providing a counter-balance to the focal organisation. An alternative or complementary basis for good governance is to establish structures and procedures internal to the focal organisation which ensure that it fulfils its fiduciary role (to work in the best interests of its primary stakeholders), strategic role (critically evaluating risk), supervisory role (to approve the actions of management), and management development role (which includes the selection and payment of senior managers). Few international sports organisations would meet these requirements, and a key research question is:
whether WADA, the IOC and the IFs do so with respect to doping?

what would an analysis of stakeholders in doping policy show?

The second, and more controversial definition of ‘good governance’ is as it is understood by international bodies such as the World Bank and, though less explicitly, the European Union which refers to the fostering of an institutional infrastructure supportive of the interests of the free market. ‘Good governance, therefore, means creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action – stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform, and a strong civil society independent of the state’ (Hirst 2000: 14). Democracy is thus an essential element of good governance. Yet if we accept that globalising pressures are leading to ‘denationalisation’ of policy the question of democratic participation in decision-making at the international level arises. Acknowledging the risk of over-exaggerating the extent of democratic control over domestic policy there is a substantial democratic deficit at the level of international policy regimes. In terms of ‘input democracy’ i.e. the extent to which those within a polity are able to affect the policy agenda there is little evidence of an awareness of the issue let alone a concern to improve the quality of input democracy. There is also a profound deficit in terms of accountability or output democracy. As Rosenau observes ‘most collectivities in globalised space are not accountable for their actions in the sense required by even a minimalist theory of democratic government’ (2000: 192).

The variety of uses of the term governance should not be seen as an impediment to analysis. On the contrary the variety is necessary in order to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of the problem of governance of anti-doping policy and prompts a series of questions for research including the following:

First, can we talk of anti-doping policy being ‘steered’ and if so by which policy actors, by what means and towards what ends?

Second, is there a European or global policy network/community for doping and if there is what are its characteristics and how effective is it in relation to the interests of contiguous networks?

Third, is there a ‘democratic deficit’ in organisations such as WADA and, if there is, how might it be reduced?

Finally, what would constitute ‘good governance’ of anti-doping policy and to what extent does good governance depend on counter-balancing authority rather than internal governance processes?
References


Houlihan, B. (1999b) Anti-doping policy in sport: the politics of international policy coordination, Public Administration, 77


Houlihan, B. (2001d) Governance, anti-doping policy and Europe, paper, Governance in sport conference, Loughborough University, April.


Barrie Houlihan
In recent years, mass media have almost daily disseminated exposure of doping, which damaged the halo of elite sports severely. Not only athletes, coaches and doctors are watched suspiciously and come more and more under fire but also sport associations as corporate actors and officials as their representatives. Associations and officials have to face two different kinds of accusation. First of all, critics of doping, sponsors from economy and politics as well as journalists reproach associations with inability in fighting against doping. They accuse them of choosing inadequate means, of not taking vigorous action, of curing only symptoms etc. Secondly, some observers even go beyond these reproaches and suspect sport associations of not being interested in fighting doping effectively at all. On the contrary, they maintain that sport associations permit doping, support it on the quiet and moreover even demand it from their athletes.

Investigative journalism, persistent efforts of some doping critics and the results of parliamentary fact-finding committees have made it plausible from case to case that these further-reaching assumptions are not pure invention. Whereas public debate cultivates unbroken moralism towards the associations, sport spectators have gradually learned to think in relative terms concerning athletes. Athletes are more and more acknowledged not to be culprits but rather to be victims. The public begins to recognize that to a great extent athletes are pushed into doping by structural constraints of their biography as well as by temptations and pressures from inside as well as outside sports. That is why athletes cannot be blamed alone for their transgressions (Bette/Schimank 1994a). Now it is the associations which are surveyed sceptically; especially the officials are often seen as the actual villains of the doping scene. But aren’t there mitigating circumstances for them as well? Wouldn’t it be appropriate to show a similar sympathetic attitude towards the officials as it is shown towards the athletes?

Our paper tries to illuminate from a sociological point of view the situation of sport associations and their officials concerning the problem of doping. In order to avoid verdicts and appeals that are out of touch with reality, such a scientific investigation should be without any moral judgement. If you are against doping, like we are, you first have to analyze why doping more and more gains ground and who is involved in what way. We assume, that doping pushes the associations into a great dilemma with no easy way out. It is not the least true that it only needs a fair amount of moral willpower to regain “clean” elite sports. Neither a purification of the officials who hold office nor their replacement with uncompromising new office bear holders could change anything crucial. Doping is a problem on the level of associations as well as on the level of athletes; but its origins are to be found in social constellations that cannot be eliminated simply by “good people”.

Coping with Doping: Sport associations under organizational stress

Karl-Heinrich Bette
Universität Heidelberg, Germany
Uwe Schimank
Fern Universität Hagen, Germany
The social position of sport associations is determined by groups who relate to them in an economic or political way, by mass media and sport audience. Our first step is to show that sport associations as corporate actors are embroiled in a double-bind situation – i.e. they are confronted with contradictory expectations that can’t be fulfilled. Thus, sport associations are trapped in view of this situation. Our second step will be to ask if there are any adequate ways out of the problem of doping for the sport associations. One very common pattern can be characterized analytically as an organizational de-coupling of “talk” and “action”. Many procedures of the sport associations correspond to this cynical pattern and fill moralists with indignation.

Up to this point our argumentation actually can be understood as efforts to arouse understanding for the very difficult situation of sport associations. A sociological explanation of their dealing with the doping problem can take off considerably some of their moral guilt. But even if it does, doping still isn’t something that should be approved or must be agreed with bad grace. Whatever exonerating or sympathetic arguments are brought to bear – doping contravenes sports moral. It is only right and proper to take sport associations at their word, concerning their moral self-definition. That is why we will take up the impetus of doping critics and ask in our third step how the search for promising solutions of the doping problem should be done in view of the analysis on hand. To make it clear right from the start: Just as anybody else we haven’t found a cure for doping that only has to be put into effect, and we are in no way sure that there are practicable solutions at all. But what we can do is learn from our considerations how such solutions can possibly be found.

It has to be emphasized that the following considerations are of a strictly theoretical nature. Even if we use illustrations sometimes to explain our arguments, we don’t deal with happenings in particular associations. One special benefit of sociological knowledge is to abstract from individual cases and to bring out general patterns. This can be done on different levels of abstraction. We choose a very high level and disregard e.g. important institutional variances between sport associations or nations. It appears advisable to us to find an abstract, general pattern first, before – theoretically based – we go into empirical variations.

Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration that the concepts of actors in sociology are always analytical fictions which do never exist in their pure form in reality. Such concepts are used to determine social possibilities for choosing how to act. If you, like we do, ask what an adequate reaction of associations to the doping problem dilemma looks like, you don’t imply that the associations are always acting totally rational. But the associations are in a “high-cost situation” (Zintl 1989) concerning the doping problem; they know that a lot is at stake for them. Because of that you can assume that they try to reach an adequate situation, i.e. at least they come close to our analytical fiction.

I Sport associations trapped in a “double-bind“

If athletes are caught at doping it puts their sport association under organizational stress; this is an acknowledged fact. They see the sport they represent and thus themselves as its organizational representative exposed to a far-reaching de-legitimation (Bette/Schimank 1994b). The constantly increasing number of doping scandals has given elite sports as a whole a bad reputation neither athletes nor associations can live with permanently. There is the real danger that
the public turns away disgustedly from such a scenery of liars and inhumanity. But without the interest of the audience, neither mass media nor economic or political sponsors are interested in elite sports. These three kinds of actors are not interested in top-class sport itself. For them, only the interest of the public is of importance which manifests itself as viewing figures, circulations, publicity value etc. It is these environmental actors and the audience who pays to get into the stadiums where the money comes from. Sport associations need these resources to reproduce themselves and to grow. In this way, the doping problem could result in a crisis of legitimacy which seriously harms elite sports and its associations.

This relationship of sport associations with the audience\(^1\), the economic and political sponsors as well as the mass media on the one hand, athletes, coaches and other people looking after the athletes on the other hand, can be understood with the help of a theoretical concept from institutional economics as a multilevel “principal-agent” constellation.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The audience certainly isn't a unitary actor but rather an unorganized collectivity. Nevertheless it makes sense to survey it analytically as a summary aggregation of individual action. Only in this way the audience is relevant for sport actors, political and economic sponsors of top-class sport and the media.

The audience as principal faces the athletes as its agents. Partly, it expresses its expectations of performance in a direct way – e.g. through applause or booing in the stadium (relation 1) – or executes its influence on the athletes in an indirect way. The support of media/politics/economy for elite sports is mainly dependent on the amount of attention of the public and hence the exploitability of elite sports. These actors within the sports systems' environment are thus agents of the audience (relation 2). Thereby, at the same time, they become intermediating principals of the sport actors (relation 3). They partly take up this position towards the athletes – e.g. through direct contacts of sponsors with athletes (relation 4). Or else, sponsors from media/politics/economy influence in the function of principals sport associations (relation 5) e.g. by allocating or taking away scarce resources. At the same time, associations are influenced directly by the public, which manifests itself in the level and changes of attention and public prestige (relation 6). Both kinds of environmental influence turn associations into agents – as a consequence they have to act as intermediating principals towards the athletes (relation 7). In fulfilling this two-fold function, sport associations pass on internal expectations of performance as well as those expectations to succeed that are addressed to them by media/politics/economy and in the end by the public (relation 8). This shows the central but also precarious situation of sport associations in a complex network of relationships.

This concept refers to social relations in which one participant – the agent – accomplishes a certain performance for someone else – the principal. From that point of view, sport associations are agents in view of the problem of doping. They are supposed to provide “clean” elite sports for society. On the other hand, sport associations are principals to their agents – the athletes. In their function as principals they have to make sure that athletes perform and succeed without doping. Associations are in a similar position as intermediate superiors in an organizational hierarchy: to be able to guarantee reliable performance of their subordinates towards the top of the hierarchy, they have to take appropriate steps towards the bottom of the hierarchy.
In view of these circumstances, shouldn’t associations try with all their might to fight doping effectively? After all “cleanness” is, like we mentioned before, a demand of sport on itself, and it is judged by this demand. “Cleanness” is a functional prerequisite if a competition is supposed to proceed according to the postulate of formal equality and openness of the result (Franke 1994). “Cleanness” is supposed to guarantee that the difference between winning and losing is produced according to criteria of sports and is not dependent on e.g. biochemical interventions.

Shouldn’t the fight against doping be in the very own interest of associations – to say nothing of ethical motives? This question supposes that fighting doping is the problem of prime importance of elite sports and that, as a consequence, the regaining of “cleanness“ can be seen as its top priority. But there is another problem which is just as important for elite sports’ legitimacy and therefore relevant for getting further resources: being successful in terms of winning competitions, establishing new records, collecting gold medals etc. The public wants to have both: “clean“ and at the same time successful athletes.

This dependence of the sport associations on success manifests itself in three dimensions. Firstly, their athletes have to be successful compared to other athletes of the same kind of sports on an international level. Secondly, success is necessary to make sure that the respective sports discipline is able to assert itself against other disciplines on a national level, in order to get attention and financial support. Thirdly, success is needed to prevent the audience from turning to other sorts of entertainments and leisure time activities.

1 The audience as principal
The double expectation of the audience described above doesn’t automatically imply a logical contradiction. “Cleanness“ isn’t preventing success per se which is demonstrated by some athletes even in our days – at least as far as we know. Although “cleanness“ doesn’t logically exclude success it is now a considerable bio-social impediment to success. With more and more rationalization and scientific exploration of possibilities to improve performance, top-class sport has actually managed to push the limits of physical capability. But doing this has not decreased or even closed the gap between expectations and physical capability but has only resulted in even greater expectations.

Mass media convey unlimited demands on athletes. An inflation of demands has taken place with no end in sight. More and more frequent competitions, with an increasing level of performance, have to be faced by athletes while winning becomes more and more important. Only very exceptional athletes can cope with this without any “supporting measures“ – to use the playing-down, internal language of elite sports in the former GDR. Additionally, even athletes who want to stay “clean“ are pushed into the trap of doping because of doping or assumed doping of others.3

The public gradually gets to know these facts. But why does it insist on “clean“ elite sports in the face of such a “totalization“ (Heinilä 1982)? Why doesn’t the public give up one half of its double expectation and is satisfied with athletes having success – whatever way that might have been achieved? The few advocates who rigorously want to permit doping, like the former president of the German swimming association, Harm Beyer, start from the assumption that this

3 See the game theoretical model of this constellation in Wagner/Keck (1990) and Bette/Schimank (1995a, 236-269).
is the real attitude of the public anyway. When asked if the audience “wants to see such cloned athletes” he replied: “Watching an event, a spectator is not the least interested to know about doping. He is only interested who wins.” If it were that way, sport associations could simply solve their doping problem by permitting doping. But are the expectations of the public really that simple structured like Beyer assumes? The following five important reasons make clear why “clean” as well as successful sports is still demanded by its audience:

(1) For many people, sport is a moral counter world to the rest of society. Interest in sport rests on the fact that competitions are “time-out” events where hard work gets its just reward. The modern work ethic is projected on top athletes in an idealistic way that no-one would ever demand from him/herself. If top athletes sometimes justify their doping, saying that there is also an enormous consumption of stimulants in working life, they are actually quite right from their point of view. But these athletes do not perceive that people expect more from them than from themselves.

(2) This general consideration manifests in a special way in admiration of sports heroes. In principle, each athlete can become a hero at any time. A hero demonstrates that individual commitment can make the decisive difference between victory and defeat. That disproves for the moment, at least, all Kafkaesque experience that people make in their everyday life with social relationships that can apparently not be influenced, such as industrial organisation of work, bureaucratic administration, mass democracy or technocracy with all its practical constraints. But a hero who dopes, loses his non-ordinary nimbus because he is nothing but a puppet on a string, with the nerve centres of the whole business being the doping labs.

(3) The audience wants to see former records being beaten. In cgs-kinds of sport, this can be measured in metric scales. In other disciplines like soccer it can be compared and beaten how often a team won a championship or a cup-final. These demands of beating records that the public directs towards athletes reflect an unbroken social faith in and longing for progress. In all other social fields the limits and drawbacks of progress are obvious. But at least with performance in sport the public wants to see improvement of the status quo – not with “dirty tricks” but with “hard work“. 

(4) Furthermore, the interest of the public in competitions has turned out to be insatiable till now. The wish to have exciting competitions daily delivered to the door by television has increased by leaps and bounds which is also due to the flood of supply by mass media. To satisfy this need, the frequency of competitions has to increase, with more and more demands on athletes. From this and from the desire of the audience for increasing performance stems a terrible pressure on athletes to dope – but that is exactly what the public doesn’t want them to do.

(5) Finally, the interest of the public in sport is always an interest in something concrete, in something that can be experienced immediately – which again is a counter world to the “abstract society” we live in (Zijderveld 1970). Everyone on the stand or in front of the television wants to be able to watch and judge immediately who wins in a competition. In this respect, too, the audience is deceived when athletes dope. If e.g. some drug is taken and works unseen somewhere in the depths of the body, decisive parameters of success cannot be made out immediately by simply looking at a competition going on. Only much later, time-consuming tests have to exclude that dirty tricks have helped to victory. The immediate experience of competition is devaluated a lot if the public gets to know from the

---

papers only a few days later that who they saw winning wasn’t a winner but a loser and likewise a supposed loser had been later chosen as the “true” winner.

All these are constitutive moments of experiencing modern elite sports (Bette/Schimank 1995b). The public will hardly change its mind in these respects; thus it demands something almost impossible. The public wants “clean” success in sport. This attitude of the public has been confirmed additionally by athletes and associations who have let the public keep its illusions over decades that an ever increasing improvement of performance in sport could be achieved constantly without doping.

For an athlete, to be successful without doping fulfils the public’s double expectation, that becomes more and more contradictory. Athletes have to adapt to this by hidden doping. That comes exactly up to what the principal-agent perspective suggests. Neglecting the associations for a moment and regarding the public as supreme principal of athletes, it can be expected theoretically that they will try to make their commitment to perform as easy as possible by shirking, i.e. cheating when performing. The more unattainable a performance level is that the principal demands from its agents, the more will they clutch at dirty tricks so they can still get the gratification for this performance.

The audience would have to draw the following conclusion if it spoke openly to itself: “On the one hand we want success. That is why we also have to want doping. But on the other hand we don’t want doping so it is best just to pretend not to know anything about it.” The long and the short of it is that the public wants to be deceived.

The explicit request to be deceived is paradoxical and impossible to be carried out, though. If someone asks to be deceived, he knows that he is going to be deceived, and due to that he can’t be deceived. Such a self-deception can be realized though, as a kind of implied attitude that has to be hidden from oneself.5 First, someone only has to look away every time he has the possibility to see what he doesn’t want to see. Second, he has to signal everyone who wants to show him what he doesn’t want to see that information of that kind is not wanted at all. Third, he can at the same time make clear that he doesn’t want to reflect upon this behaviour altogether. If you look away like this, and don’t allow yourself to be persuaded to look at the problem or to look at your looking away, you can deceive yourself permanently with the help of a deceiving surrounding. Even if you can’t avoid to be confronted with some signs of evidence, you can still refuse to connect them and to draw a conclusion. A lot of citizens in national socialist Germany who didn’t want to know about the holocaust illustrate this mechanism of suppression just like a terminally ill person who doesn’t want to be confronted with his near fate. Such a self-deception is wanted whenever one’s wishes stand in insoluble contradiction to one’s abilities – like with a terminally ill person – or to one’s moral attitudes – like with the Germans during National Socialism.

The public’s attitude towards doping can be seen in a similar way. On the one hand doping is still seen as morally reprehensible. For the audience this is a normative way to express the previously mentioned motives. The public is not willing to let doping spoil what they gain from enjoying sport. But on the other hand, as long as doping goes unnoticed it helps a great deal to satisfy exactly these motives of the public. That is why the public can’t do without secret doping.

5 In general, concerning the psychologic of self-deception see Fingarette (1969).
of athletes anymore. Rigorous advocates like Beyer fail to see this dependence of the public on being deceived if they ask for permitting doping and thus strive for an end to hypocrisy. They misjudge the social function of ignorance (Moore/Tumin 1949; Schneider 1962). Certain ways of satisfaction of one’s needs obviously are only possible as long as one refuses to know disillusioning details about the way it was achieved. If you go to the circus e.g., you don’t want to know about possibly cruel methods of training or keeping the animals. That would only spoil the joy you get from the tricks.

Consequently, the public can satisfy its desire to see “clean” and successful performance through self-deception. It is only rational for all other relevant actors to adapt themselves to that. The utility of elite sports for mass media, economic and political sponsors is directly dependent on the extent of interest of the public. So their attitude towards doping is clearly preconceived. None of them has a genuine own interest in damming doping. On the contrary, as long as doping takes place secretly and helps self-deception of the public, it meets exactly the interest of media, economy and politics in elite sports. If doping is exposed, so that the public can’t ignore it anymore and sports gets a bad reputation, the actors in politics, the economy and the mass media only have to distance themselves from doping and morally condemn it to the same extent.

If you phrase it in Goffman’s (1956) terminology, the expectations of the public are like this: it only wants to know what happens on the “front stage” of elite sports and is not interested in knowing that there is a “back stage” at all. As a result of that, media, economic and political sponsors want the public to stay ignorant though they themselves know what’s happening on back stage and some of them even are involved. As soon as the public gets to see parts of incidents on back stage, through scandals, self-accusation etc., actors have to deny that they ever had anything to do with it or even known about it.

We can’t discuss here in detail how exposure of doping comes about (Bette/Schimank 1995a, 273-288). It is a combination of several factors: moralists within the sport system who want to brand doping, doping inspectors whose job is to search for doping practices and mass media who are always interested in scandals, in their short-term interest of newsworthiness, even if the attractiveness of elite sports as a topic is put at risk in the long term. One thing is clear: As soon as the public isn’t able to ignore doping activities on back stage anymore, the latent contradictoriness of the double expectation to have a “clean“ as well as successful top-class sport will turn into a serious dilemma. In times of undiscovered, secret doping, public demanded from athletes: “Be ‘clean’ and successful!” But now, after the formerly good reputation of elite sports has severely suffered, the demand addressed to the associations is: “Make sure that your athletes become ‘clean’ again – but remain successful!” And media, political and economic actors have to join this chorus.

2 Associations as agents and principals
Associations are now facing the organizational stress caused by the doping problem. To characterize this stress more precisely, we can use the double-bind concept that comes from therapeutical experience (cf. Bateson 1969). The therapist Simon (1988, 146) reduces the nature of a double-bind situation to the following formula: “A message and a message about the message comment each other in a way that a paradoxical demand to act results, that can only be complied by not complying.“ Such a dilemma always occurs when an actor is confronted with two contradictory expectations in a social relation that is of vital significance and cannot be terminated. He is now supposed to fulfil both expectations but he can’t clear up this contradic-
Coping with Doping: Sport associations under organizational stress

The explicit message sport associations get from the public and other actors concerning doping is the one already mentioned. Associations are supposed to get rid of doping without their athletes becoming less successful. But the implicit comment in this demand is: “Don’t do anything that puts success of your athletes at risk.” Associations are constantly reminded of two things: firstly their own extreme dependence on resources from environmental actors and secondly, the dependence of success on guaranteed resources. Without the financial income of admission charges, contracts with sponsors, governmental contributions and television rights, most of the disciplines in elite sports would immediately collapse. But the amount of these contributions is decisively determined by national and international success of the athletes.

The unspoken but nevertheless constantly present message to the associations is: “Do without ‘cleanness’ whenever it threatens success – but don’t get caught.” Thus, the implicit message clearly contradicts the explicit one. Such a contradiction between expectations can of course not be made explicit and discussed with the other actors, which is the reason why it pushes associations into a catch-22-situation. Sport associations are not able to make the public aware of the actually given impossibility to fulfil the explicit expectation as long as the implicit one is valid and more important. The public simply doesn’t want to do without success of athletes in the long run – in that point, Beyer is quite right with his judgement. Sport associations can neither offend the public with effective steps against doping that threaten success, nor can they risk to incur the publics displeasure by making them aware of the contradictory nature of their expectations. It is exactly this insight, the public wants to avoid. An actor Ego who pushes another actor Alter into a double-bind usually doesn’t want to admit it. Alter is supposed to carry the can that has been loaded onto him. Only this way Ego can have his cake and eat it, too.

Concerning the doping problem, sport associations are therefore not only culprits, as they are more and more made out to be, but also victims – victims of those who don’t want to admit that they are also culprits in the sense of instigation to deviance. The public shoves the negative effects of their self-deception onto the associations. Other actors remain silent or even confirm them in their doing. Double-binds generally show a circular causal structure, so that victims are culprits at the same time and likewise. Even if you can find out who acted as culprit first, this has become irrelevant after a short time. An auto-dynamic of action and reaction has gathered momentum. To put it in a paradox way: The cause very quickly produces itself. The public has been lied to and deceived over decades by athletes and associations with the tacit connivance of media, as well as political and economic sponsors. Therefore it was a victim. The social and also local distance to athletes and associations made this even easier. But the activities of the associations and environmental actors only led to themselves falling more and more into the role of the victim. The public could lead itself to believe in having nothing to do at all with all these doping affairs. An individual sports spectator won’t see himself as the cause for doping. He will see himself rather as an observer who has no significant influence at all over that. He fails to see the aggregate effect of many similar motives of millions of spectators. Even spectators who are vehemently against doping, are decisive factors only because of their interest in sport. Though they really like to conceal it even from themselves. The fact that sport associa-

---

6 On such auto-dynamics, see generally Mayntz/Nedelmann (1987).
tions don’t pick out the denial of responsibility on the side of the public as a central theme, makes them accomplice in setting up the double-bind because they confirm the self-deception of the public.

How can sport associations that got into such a double-bind trap handle the situation: what can they possibly do as rational actors if they have to satisfy their own primary interests of continued existence and growth in the first place? In the following consideration, like before, we deliberately want to avoid asking what associations should do from an ethical point of view. An answer to this would simply have to degenerate into moralism that generously overlooks the tough reality of structural constraints. Instead of that we want to find out what an appropriate reaction of sport associations would be, being at the mercy of contradictory expectations. We will see that certain common reactions of associations towards the problem of doping are quite adequate to the situation in that sense.

Definitely not adequate to the situation would be any reaction which follows the demands of moral doping critics: i.e. every step to fight doping effectively – especially a rigorous intensification of doping controls. That would lead to maximum “cleanness” at the expense of success if it were logistically and financially possible. But that would only fulfil one half of the public’s double expectation. What matters is, to come up to both expectations.

Some general considerations of organizational sociologist Brunsson (1989) make this complex problem more clear. He supposes that many organizations in all areas of society – not only sport associations that are not even taken into consideration by Brunsson – are bothered with contradictory expectations of their environment. A very common reaction of organizations is a de-coupling of “talk” and “action”: of what the organization pretends to do and what it actually does or permits secretly. Like any other step to fight doping effectively, an intensification of controls by sport associations would be a tight coupling of “talk” and “action”: you do exactly what you say and thus break one of the two contradictory expectations by strictly obeying the other one. De-coupling, on the other hand, leads to hypocrisy: “Organizational talk is adapted to some norms, and action to others” (Brunsson 1989, 172). That way the trick can be done to fulfil both expectations at the same time. Calling it hypocrisy already makes clear that such actions are not only suspicious but clearly not approvable from an ethical point of view. But isn’t it immoral in a higher sense to ask from an actor, who is trapped in a dilemma, such moral demands? Hypocrisy of associations is nothing else but self-defence in view of the hypocrisy of the sports public and actors from the mass media, politics and economy who support this attitude. Transmitted to the principal-agent concept this means that hypocrisy is shirking of sport associations in their role as agents when they try to fulfil the increasing expectations of their social principal, namely, to guarantee successful and equally “clean” elite sports.

There are several ways to split up “talk” and “action” (cf. Brunsson 1989, 32-38). A segregation on different levels of organizations would provide a solution for sport associations. On the level of the athletes, “action” should primarily meet the expectations of the public, i.e. secret doping

---

7 Brunsson is only talking about a special, well-known case from sociological role and reference-group theory: several different actors direct contradictory expectations towards some role-player. In contrast to this, double-binds - like the one introduced in this paper - originate from one and the same reference-group having contradictory expectations.

8 See also Gouldner’s (1954, 182-187, 216) concept of “mock bureaucracy”.
should happen that pretends to be according to the rules. On the top of the associations, “talking” should fulfill the demand of the public for “cleanliness” by upholding the official sports moral and covering up doping activities. The practices of associations to be described in the following in fact meet this pattern of an adequate dealing with the double-bind dilemma caused by contradictory expectations of the environment.

II De-coupling of “talk” and “action” as an adequate reaction of associations to the situation

At first glance, a sociological observer finds out that sport associations react in the same way to doping of their athletes like other parts of the society handle deviant behaviour when they want to restore compliance with the rules. On the one hand, there’s the attempt to secure conformity of behaviour by persuasion and pedagogical action. These measures aim at an internalization of the sports moral by the athletes, so that they are able to say “no” to doping. On the other hand, organized sport relies on the intensification of controls and severe sanctions where appeals and educational efforts fail because of the temptations and the pressure of success on individual athletes.

On looking more carefully, one additionally realizes certain practices of sport associations that are not aimed at effectively damming doping but on influencing public opinion on this issue. Thus we are in the dimension of “talk”. To that category belong, first of all, all efforts to stop public talk about doping. That happens through suppression or elimination of relevant information so that there isn’t any gossipping at all or at least it is put to an end soon. Doping – which actually happens and is not effectively stopped or at least reduced – is concealed as far as possible. If then there actually are public exposures of doping that can’t be denied anymore, methods of symbolic action are used. Thus, symbolic appeasement is the fallback strategy whenever omission and concealment don’t work anymore.

1 Omission and Concealment

Sociological reflections as well as everyday understanding of action is dominated by an emphasis on active behaviour. However, non-action is under certain circumstances to be regarded as action as well: if a certain action was expected and possible but the actor did not choose to act in this way (Geser 1986a; 1986b). Especially if there is a normative expectation, not fulfilling such an expectation is regarded as a deliberate choice of the actor, as an omission of what should have been done. Omissions especially are relied on by an actor to reach forbidden aims. Obviously, this has to be hidden from the respective reference-group. An important form of hiding is silence in the sense of not speaking about what one actually did. This silence is to cover up omission and thus to protect it from criticism by the reference-group which would really be annoyed if it knew.

Such methods can be found in all social systems. It is actually this action through non-action that sport associations have practised in a big way with respect to the doping problem. By now, journalistic exposures, investigations of insiders who are willing to talk and reports of various investigation committees have brought enough empirical proof that omission and concealment were used, and still are used by sport associations and a collaborating environment. Let’s illustrate this a little bit: If officials don’t install doping controls and other measures against doping though there are clear signs of doping; if they close their eyes to such phenomena against their own judgement; if they cut those topics out of the agenda of their association; if they don’t investigate evidence about doping among their athletes and don’t ask any questions:
In all these circumstances, officials of sport associations don’t do just nothing but act deliberately by not acting.

There are three major ways on the part of the associations of omission of expected normative fight against doping: toleration of doping, pressure to dope and support of doping on the side of their athletes. Support of doping on the part of the associations is usually what small groups surrounding individual athletes or coaches do. Most of an association’s departments or officials practise the other two forms of omitting the fight against doping. On the one hand, they cultivate the “Pilatus-syndrom”, i.e. they wash their hands of the matter by not looking at it. On the other hand, they exert an omnipresent tacit compulsion to dope on athletes and coaches, threatening them with refusal of resources.

For German associations, the report of the Independent Doping Committee (1991, 199) noticed: “The committee assumes that those responsible in German sport have suspected and even known of abuse of anabolics in German elite sports since 1976 at the latest.“ Long before that, there has been definite knowledge about doping on the part of associations. Not only in regard to anabolics and of course not only in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has gradually turned out that not only sport associations in former Socialist countries pursued massive doping. Sport associations of western countries haven’t confined themselves on generously looking away from doping of their athletes either. Again and again, officials of western associations have more or less supported doping of their athletes with a wink, not carrying out actions against it. After all, their success in sports is of utmost importance for the associations’ standing and supply with resources. German associations e.g. get their financial support from federal government according to the number of medals at international championships.

As a result of this, associations put a high doping pressure on athletes by setting norms for participation at Olympic Games or world championships which were and in some cases still are that high, that they can almost not be achieved without doping, a fact that is well-known to officials. Michael Beckereit e.g., spokesman of the athletes of the German Sport Association, in 1982 called this fact a double morality, dealt with on the back of the athletes. In a newspaper article it is said (Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 28.12.1982): “On the one hand, the Deutsche Sportbund upholds – according to Beckereit ... – the declaration of principle of elite sports in which doping is forbidden. On the other hand, they ask for a chance to reach the finals as a qualification norm for the Olympic games. This is a contradiction in itself.”

In western countries as far as we know, there is no comprehensive active involvement on the part of associations concerning doping. But a passive toleration was and still is far spread which finds expression in delayed and lax controls. It is not necessary here, to discuss more detailed how they manage secret omission. Newspaper articles and reports from investigation committees give enough illustrative material. A reflection of organizational sociology calls such behaviour “useful illegality” (Luhmann 1964, 304-314). This term describes behaviour that is against official organizational norms but helps the organization to reach its goal and to secure its existence – e.g. disregard of safety regulations to make the production of goods faster and cheaper and guarantee the enterprise to be competitive. Contradictions that can’t be solved otherwise would result in an organizational crisis if there wasn’t the possibility of walling off and disguising.⁹ Omission, concealment and silence like it is done in many sport associations.

⁹ cf. in general Sievers (1974, 50-79).
has exactly the function to conceal the “useful illegality” of doping to be able to carry on using it despite all official statements. If one association rigorously used the existing apparatus of sanctions and made subversive actions of deviant athletes public, this would result in a competitive disadvantage with respect to other associations. The purpose of not taking steps in the case of doping is to prevent weakening of national elite sports on an international level.

Up to now, associations have rhetorically accepted the normative expectation addressed to them to fight doping and have not ignored it openly. The omission of the associations is not only hidden but even dressed up as energetic action. This presupposes that associations not only have to conceal doping. They also have to conceal that doping is essential to them as “useful illegality” as long as it is not discovered. This means they have to hide the fact that there actually is something to be hidden. Even the existence of a secret must be kept secret. That is exactly why doping scandals turn out to be explosive. In an eruptive and exemplary way, they draw the attention to the fact that deviation happens because it is functionally necessary and therefore it is usually covered.

Omission, concealment and silence can altogether be characterized as “defensive structuring” (Siegel 1970, 11-32). By “defensive structuring” actors avoid duping important reference-groups thereby securing their legitimacy and resources. Omission and concealment prevent actual collision of contradictory expectations, and silence suppresses the discussion of this explosive topic. As long as those practices work, i.e. doping isn’t exposed on a huge scale, associations can come to terms with their double-bind.

2 Symbolic appeasement

As soon as omission, concealment and withholding as strategic steps are publicly exposed and attributed to the associations as deliberate action, it gets very unpleasant in the double-bind. That is the moment, when it is no longer sufficient on the part of the associations to cover up their omissions with pure rhetoric. Simply explaining that one agrees with public expectations about fighting doping doesn’t work anymore. “Talk” has to be supplied with “action” or even replaced by it if the respective association don’t want to lose credibility. Though, again, “action” in the sense of fighting doping mustn’t go that far that it stems doping at the expense of success.

These are the parameters of action which the associations have to respect from then on. On the one hand doping mustn’t be disturbed seriously, but on the other hand the association has to give the impression that it actually does just that. A simulation of fighting doping through symbolic appeasement must be performed. Such pretended action, again, is an omission but this time it doesn’t have to be hidden like the previously mentioned practices. This time it pretends to be vigorous action. You pretend to be re-establishing official normative standards and in this way camouflage your real aims of continuing doping. By a make-belief that you change you stay the same.

This make-belief implies that officials of sport associations often don’t mean what they say, and with good reason as the athlete Matthias Mellinghaus explains (Sports 3/1989, 120): “There is no doubt that this double morality exists. Off the records, the officials know exactly what’s going on with doping while outwardly they keep up appearances. But you have to see that in their associations officials are under pressure just like you: If the money is divided you have to have a certain number of medals and if you don’t you are left empty-handed.” If e.g. an asso-
association installs a control system but at the same time exercises the controls in a way that it is unlikely that doping is discovered, it only pretends to be willing to change something.

The following methods of symbolic action (Edelman 1964; 1971; 1988) were and still are widely used by sport associations:

- A more and more drastic language is used to get others to believe one’s will and energy to fight doping. Moral condemnation becomes stronger and determination is expressed in a more martial way. With this, associations demonstrate agreement with those who ask publicly for action. Associations count on the psychological automatism that vigorous words are associated with action.
- They intensify pedagogical steps although they know exactly that such steps make no impression at all on athletes and their supporting environment. Fair-Play initiatives and other advertising campaigns for ethical behaviour are started. By this publicity associations can show not only words and promises but action. If you take a closer look though, those “actions” are again only “talk”, appeals that are known to be unimpressive on athletes.
- Associations bring investigation committees into action to examine the doping problem before they take any steps. In doing this, associations manage to gain time and to demonstrate feigned determination to go to the bottom of the affair. Reports of the committees are showed some time to the public as a proof of activities – if the public is then still interested in this topic. If the committee concludes that the problem had been exaggerated, officials are cleared of their passivity in retrospect. An appropriate recruitment of the committee members makes such a “harmless” result even more probable. But even a critical report is not so bad because then the association can state to take the appropriate steps on this basis.
- The association appoints an anti-doping representative and installs doping controls. But on the quiet it arranges little steps to delay things, restricts the inspector’s authorities or refuses resources. Thus it is made sure that the inspectors have a hard time doing their work. Again, there is also the possibility to choose persons as inspectors who are willing to collaborate or at least inexperienced.
- Associations punish in public athletes who were caught. By these “examples”, associations can express intransigence and moral integrity. In this respect, it is essential that these cases are presented as individual decisions. Any structural pressure to dope, especially any involvement of the association in such pressure, must be denied.
- Associations coopt persons who appeared in the public as opponents of doping in representative positions – possibly even as anti-doping representatives. These people are made to believe that the association really wants to change. They are enthroned officially as personifications of a new direction. However, in their attempts to install effective methods for fighting doping within the association, they are cut down by the association. If possible, they don’t even realize it.
- Actual steps against doping that are taken half-heartedly or with a wink contribute especially to symbolic appeasement. They signal the will to fight the problem, and occasional success signals an apparent ability to actually accomplish something.

The general line of all these and other methods of symbolic appeasement can be reduced to the following denominator: They permanently promise new reforms and thus install a merry-go-round of reforms, the “futures approach” (Brunsson 1989, 172f). The disappointment of not having reached the envisaged goal is not categorised as a proof of futility. Instead, it is seen
positively as a new stimulant for further efforts again and again. The time up to the first success of the reforms is declared an interim-phase. During this phase the associations grant themselves insufficiency and expect tolerance from their environment. However, the interim phase becomes the permanent state of affairs.

A clever combination of those methods helps associations a great deal to be able to cope with their double-bind situation. It is clear that symbolic appeasement as well as omission, concealment and silence are only stabilizing the double-bind. In attributing the doping problems only to themselves and not to their reference-groups, especially the audience, associations adapt to the double-bind. By splitting “talk” and “action” they conceal the double-bind from the public – including its involvement in it. That is why associations are accomplices in the production and reproduction of the double-bind.

The strategy of symbolic appeasement naturally requires certain actually taken steps of fighting doping. It’s no accident that the public has the opinion that associations seriously try to put an end to doping. This opinion needs some empirical evidence. Only in this way associations are able to pretend to fight doping. The German Independent Doping Committee (1991, 199) precisely described this minimum “action” German sport associations had to do: “Demands for rigorous steps have only been complied half-heartedly; especially the problem of controls during the breaks in training have not been tackled so far. Steps against doping were restricted on decrees of a number of resolutions and declarations and similar measures that have to be described as alibi-actions in retrospect.” If those measures are going well, sport associations get a public judgement like the one expressed in a comment on the exposure of Ben Johnson at the Olympic Games in Seoul 1988: “We have to be grateful to the officials in Seoul that they avenged this case mercilessly.” With this “they showed that it is not the Games that have to be condemned, where thousands of athletes are competing fairly to win, but the individual case of deception” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.09.1988). Had this commentator been employed by the Olympic Committee, he couldn’t have written it better on in their sense! Some years later the president of the German athletics association, Helmut Meyer (Sports, 1.4.1993) admitted frankly that almost all athletes in the Seoul 100 meter final had taken doping.

In view of such activities, the sport journalist Andreas Singler (1993, 1) noticed: “that a number of steps to fight doping had rather been taken to calm the public and not to solve the problem.” Certainly that was not only true for the past but will also be true in the future. The fact that associations don’t really have to prove what they actually do against doping is a decisive factor for the dominant use of those strategies for coping with doping. The effectiveness of their steps against doping is not checked systematically. Symbolic action lives on the fact that it is not taken at its word. Those who are supposed to be appeased are satisfied with the vague belief that something happens. This feigning of effective and rigorous action suffices for the audience because it really wants to be deceived. If spectators ever take a look behind the scenes of elite sports, driven by their voyeuristic curiosity and with the help of the media, and delight in the taste-buds of a huge sport scandal, they are easily calmed again by some symbolic appeasement which leads them to believe that the ideal world of sport is quickly sorted out again by the sport associations and the scandal only goes back to individual failure.

Associations can, furthermore, rely on the fact that doping will go through the usual “issue-attention-cycle” (Downs 1972) of public opinion. Doping isn’t a problem that can be solved quickly once and for all with a rigorous exertion. It is a chronic problem amongst others that are
far more important, such as pollution of the environment, unemployment, or increasing crime rates. If the public once has realized that, it gets used to doping. Apart from some moralists all the others pick up the same kind of fatalistic cynicism in regard to doping as to so many other problems. An opinion poll in 1992 (Der Spiegel, 24.2.1992) revealed that only 5% of the Germans still believed that important victories were achieved without doping.

III How to find a way out of the “double-bind”

Double-binds divide the actors involved into two groups. Apart from the – mostly strongest – group of those who accept the double-bind and come to terms with it in de-coupling “talk” from “action”, there is also the group of “honest innovators“ who want to find a way out of this situation. They play an ambivalent role. On the one hand they are “useful idiots“ because they serve the function of symbolic appeasement, signalling a change to the better to the outer world. Thus they help, paradoxically, to perpetuate what they fight. On the other hand, “innovators” can be indispensable catalysts for learning. It depends on various conditions not to be examined here which of those two functions of the “innovators” predominate. Still, if there is any chance for them to be catalysts for learning, success of their efforts depends critically on how they organize their actions. In conclusion, we now want to turn to that point. Without having proven it, we start from the assumption that the “innovators“ may achieve a positive effect in sport associations. Our question is: Where do they have to start from?

In families with a double-bind, the chances for successful treatment are better than for sport associations in more than one respect. Firstly, the therapist is an acknowledged social authority for the family which makes it easier for him to intervene. Secondly, there’s always the possibility to remove the victim of the double-bind from the family. Both these possibilities are not given in the case of sport associations. The sociological observer who diagnoses the dilemma has no authority to convince economic and political actors, mass media and sport spectators with his knowledge. Sport associations also cannot be removed from their social environment and be taken into a less pathological context. Last but not least, sport associations can very well endure their position in the double-bind and thus even stabilize it. Obviously sport associations are not yet under “life-threatening“ pressure despite of many, many scandals.

All that doesn’t make it easier for treatment. But still, there is some good advice to give to those who seriously want to fight doping:

(1) With regard to the ongoing doping and the still existing structural pressure for it the motto can only be to keep on with public information and far-reaching scandalizing of this deviance! That is a basic condition to overcome any double-bind through learning. It has to be visible for everyone in a way that no-one can overlook it. The productive unrest that could be observed in recent years now in some – by no means in all – associations has to be made fruitful for a change. Organised sport has to accept the painful knowledge that scandals are obviously imperative as a precondition for the possibility to learn and change something. Only after exposures in recent years, a compulsory honest confrontation of elite sports with itself started. If you ask what would have changed in elite sports without the scandals in recent years, the answer could only be: even less than the little bit that has actually changed.

(2) When scandalizing, you have to emphasize structural constraints of doping. Only then a systemic need of reforms can be justified. Otherwise it is only the victims of the double-bind again that are turned into putative accomplice. It is important of course, to illustrate
with individual athletes the effects of structural constraints because systemic constraints always find expression in individual deviant behaviour. But it doesn’t help to depict doping as the failure of a few or even of a lot of individuals. You have to make sure though, that structural constraints are not dramatized in a way that changing seems pointless. In that case the demonstration of such restrictions is also an excuse for inactivity. You have to make aware of the fact that these constraints are certainly serious but can be changed.

(3) Doping is a phenomenon with complex structures and processes. That is why you have to design similarly complex countermeasures. Attempts to solve the problem have to take into account the complex constellation of interests of many actors. Isolated marginal measures are simply bound to fail. They miss relevant factors, obscure the problem or cancel each other out and neutralize. There’s no sense in hoping for an Olympic pedagogy or uphold fair-play-ideals if, at the same time, expectations of performance grow and contracts of coaches are made dependant on success of athletes. Actors in sport have to learn that they can’t eliminate contradictions and excessive demands with uncoordinated measures.

(4) If you view it objectively, a complex solution can only consist of an intelligent combination of mutually supporting measures. None of the strategies that have so far been developed and used is able to lead out of the double-bind. The limited capacities of any solution can probably support and strengthen each other mutually. At least one should try everything to check these possibilities. What matters is not only to add different methods but to combine them usefully. What that could mean is not conceivable at the momentary state of knowledge. We have to learn much more about the complex working of elite sports in its societal environment to design really effective measures against doping.

(5) Sociologically it is important for the conception as well as for the realization of appropriate measures to get done a concerted action of all those who are involved in the problem. Doping is a phenomenon that originates from a complex constellation of actors inside and outside sports. A solution can only be found if this whole constellation – including its international dimension – is taken into account. Public pressure based on permanent scandals could help to make all relevant actors aware of how important and imperative it is for each of them to get together. Doping critics would also have to be invited. How to behave in such a concerted action and what can be achieved in what way has to stay open at this place. At least there are examples in other areas of society where a constellation of actors tried to solve similarly serious problems in such a way.

Reference List


Bette, Karl-Heinrich and Uwe Schimank, 1995b: Zuschauerinteressen am Spitzensport: Teil-
(systemische Modernisierung des gesamtgesellschaftlich Verdrängten. In: J. Hinsching / F.
Borkenhagen (Hrsg.), Modernisierung und Sport, 181-191.

Brunsson, Nils, 1989: The Organization of Hypocrisy. Talk, decisions, and actions in organiza-
tions. Chichester.


Interest 28, 38-50.


Press.

Edelman, Murray J., 1971: Politics as Symbolic Action. Mass Arousal and Quiescence, Chi-
cago, IL: Markham.

Edelman, Murray J., 1988: Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago, IL: University of Chi-
cago Press.


Franke, Elk, 1994: Dopingdiskurse. Eine Herausforderung für die Sportwissenschaft. In: Karl-
Heinrich Bette (Hrsg.), Doping im Leistungssport – sozialwissenschaftlich beobachtet.

Geser, Hans, 1986a: Über die wachsende Bedeutung des Unterlassens in der "aktiven Gesell-
schaft". In: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 1, 71-90.

Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38, 643-669.

Piper 1969.


Heinilä, Kalevi, 1982: The Totalization Process in International Sport. In: Sportwissenschaft 20,
27-42.

Humblot.

Mayntz, Renate and Brigitte Nedelmann, 1987: Eigendynamische soziale Prozesse. In: Kölner

Science 28, 739-777.

Moore, Wilbert and Melvin M. Tumin, 1949: Some Social Functions of Ignorance. In:

Schneider, L., 1962: The Role of the Category of Ignorance in Sociological Theory: an Ex-


Program

Chairman: Professor Sigmund Loland,
The Norwegian University for Sport and
Physical Education; member of the board of the research program Sport, society
and the voluntary sector

0900 – 0920 Welcome
Hans B Skaset, chairman of the board of the research program Sport, society
and the voluntary sector

The workshop – goals for the day
Professor Sigmund Loland

0920 – 1000 Historical perspectives
Professor John Hoberman,
University of Texas, Austin

1000 – 1040 Innovations in doping and performance-enhancement - what are the (new)
challenges facing us now and in the future?
Professor Bengt Saltin,
August Krogh Institute, University of Copenhagen

1040 – 1110 Coffee

1110 – 1150 Medical sociology
Professor Ivan Waddington,
University of Leicester

1150 – 1230 Sport policy
Professor Barrie Houlihan,
Loughborough University

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1330 – 1410 Doping in alternative sport cultures
Associate professor Jan Todd,
University of Texas, Austin

1410 – 1450 Ethics
Professor Gunnar Breivik and professor Sigmund Loland,
The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education

1450 – 1530 Comments on research on doping in
sport
Professor dr. med. Arne Ljungqvist, President,
The Swedish Sports Confederation

1530 –1545 Coffee

1545 – 1700 Open table discussion: Topics and strategies for future research on
doping in sport
# List of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abrahamsen, Tore *</td>
<td>The Research Council of Norway</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tore.abrahamsen@bi.no">tore.abrahamsen@bi.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Andersen, Rune</td>
<td>Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rune.andersen@nif.idrett.no">rune.andersen@nif.idrett.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Archetti, Eduardo *</td>
<td>Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo</td>
<td><a href="mailto:eduardo.archetti@sai.uio.no">eduardo.archetti@sai.uio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bahr, Roald</td>
<td>The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td><a href="mailto:roald@nih.no">roald@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Barland, Bjørn</td>
<td>The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td><a href="mailto:bjornb@nih.no">bjornb@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bergsgard, Nils Asle</td>
<td>Telemark Research Institute</td>
<td><a href="mailto:bergsgar@tmforskbo.no">bergsgar@tmforskbo.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bette, Karl-Heinrich</td>
<td>Universität Heidelberg</td>
<td><a href="mailto:karlbette@uni-hd.de">karlbette@uni-hd.de</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Breivik, Gunnar</td>
<td>The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td><a href="mailto:gunnarb@nih.no">gunnarb@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Damsgaard, Rasmus</td>
<td>The Copenhagen Muscle Research Center</td>
<td><a href="mailto:antidoping@cmrc.dk">antidoping@cmrc.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Glomsaker, Paul</td>
<td>The Ministry of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td><a href="mailto:paul.glomsaker@kd.dep.no">paul.glomsaker@kd.dep.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hallén, Jostein</td>
<td>The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td><a href="mailto:josteinh@nih.no">josteinh@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hansen, Atle Ørbeck</td>
<td>Telemark Research Institute</td>
<td><a href="mailto:atle.o.hansen@hit.no">atle.o.hansen@hit.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hoberman, John</td>
<td>University of Texas, Austin</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hoberman@mail.utexas.edu">hoberman@mail.utexas.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Houlihan, Barrie</td>
<td>Loughborough University</td>
<td><a href="mailto:B.M.J.Houlihan@lboro.ac.uk">B.M.J.Houlihan@lboro.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ibsen, Bjarne *</td>
<td>Research Institute of Sport, Body and Culture, Denmark</td>
<td><a href="mailto:b.ibsen@pc.dk">b.ibsen@pc.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kristiansen, Petter</td>
<td>Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports</td>
<td><a href="mailto:petter.kristiansen@nif.idrett.no">petter.kristiansen@nif.idrett.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Lauritzen, Hege</td>
<td>National Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hl@sirus.no">hl@sirus.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ljungqvist, Arne</td>
<td>The Swedish Sports Confederation</td>
<td><a href="mailto:arne.ljungqvist@rf.se">arne.ljungqvist@rf.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Loland, Sigmund *</td>
<td>The Norwegian University for Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sigmundl@nih.no">sigmundl@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lund, Hanne Solveig</td>
<td>Hormone Laboratory, Section for Doping Analysis, Aker Hospital</td>
<td><a href="mailto:h.s.lund@online.no">h.s.lund@online.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Olsson, Tor Bjarne</td>
<td>RF - Rogaland Research</td>
<td><a href="mailto:TorBjarne.Olsson@rf.no">TorBjarne.Olsson@rf.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Pedersen, Willy</td>
<td>Norwegian Social Research (NOVA)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:willy.pedersen@isaf.no">willy.pedersen@isaf.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rauset, Solbjørg *</td>
<td>The Research Council of Norway</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sol@forskningsradet.no">sol@forskningsradet.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Saltin, Bengt</td>
<td>August Krogh Institute, University of Copenhagen</td>
<td><a href="mailto:cmrc@rh.dk">cmrc@rh.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Skaset, Hans B *</td>
<td>The research programme Sport, society and the voluntary sector</td>
<td><a href="mailto:hansbs@nih.no">hansbs@nih.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Email</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Solheim, Anders</td>
<td>The Ministry of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td><a href="mailto:anders.solheim@kd.dep.no">anders.solheim@kd.dep.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Støkken, Anne Marie</td>
<td>Agder University College</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Anne.M.Stokken@hia.no">Anne.M.Stokken@hia.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Tangen, Jan Ove</td>
<td>Telemark University College</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jan.o.tangen@hit.no">jan.o.tangen@hit.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Thomassen, Frode</td>
<td>The Ministry of Cultural Affairs</td>
<td><a href="mailto:frode.thomassen@kd.dep.no">frode.thomassen@kd.dep.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Todd, Jan</td>
<td>University of Texas, Austin</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ttjt@centurytel.net">ttjt@centurytel.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Todd, Terry</td>
<td>University of Texas, Austin</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ttjt@centurytel.net">ttjt@centurytel.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Tollånes, Ingrid</td>
<td>Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ingrid.tollanes@nif.idrett.no">ingrid.tollanes@nif.idrett.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Tungland, Else M.</td>
<td>IGOR-partner</td>
<td><a href="mailto:else.tungland@rf.no">else.tungland@rf.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Waddington, Ivan</td>
<td>University of Leicester</td>
<td><a href="mailto:iw11@leicester.ac.uk">iw11@leicester.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Wichstrøm, Lars</td>
<td>Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lars.wichstrom@sv.ntnu.no">lars.wichstrom@sv.ntnu.no</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The research program *Sport, society and the voluntary sector*
Announcement of funds for research on doping

Application deadline: 15 September 2001

The action plan for anti-doping work in Norway (the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, October 1999) states that increased efforts will be made against doping. The struggle against doping is also a central concern for the Norwegian Olympic Committee and Confederation of Sports (NIF), and this organisation has supported research as part of its work to prevent doping.

In order to enhance the effect of this work the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and NIF have decided to co-ordinate the funds available for research related to doping. Social and humanistic research on doping will be organised as part of The Research Council of Norway's Programme Sport, Society and the Voluntary Sector. The Programme Committee hereby announces funds for new research projects on doping.

There is a need to map and analyse the kinds and the scope of doping, as well as study the consequences of doping. In particular projects are invited that are designed to:

- Map and analyse the extent of doping inside and outside organised sports, including population studies among children, youth and adults, as well as other relevant environments. The Programme Committee believes that it is of particular importance to initiate comparative, longitudinal studies to map use patterns over extended periods of time and the relationship of various population groups to doping.
- Provide insights into incriminated environments in order to understand the mechanisms and processes that form the use of dope and user environments, including the social and sub-cultural characteristics of incriminated environments, and by which any similarities and connections with the use of other drugs can be analysed.
- Clarify to what extent dope users develop addiction, violent behaviour and psychological problems.
- Map and analyse the distribution and sale of doping, including the connection with the sale of narcotics and other drugs.
- Analyse what characterises doping as an ethical dilemma, as well as analyse justifications given for the ban on doping.

International projects as well as comparative studies are encouraged.

Further details can be obtained from Tore Abrahamsen, Programme Co-ordinator, of the Norwegian School of Management BI, tel. 675 57 703 (direct), 675 57 000 (operator) or 950 21 304; e-mail: tore.abrahamsen@bi.no

Applications must be submitted on the application form of The Research Council of Norway. Applications relating to projects dealing with doping should be submitted in English. For applications that are not submitted in English a one-page summary in English is required. The reason for this is the desire of the Programme Committee to establish international co-operation on research relating to doping.

Application form and guidelines for completion can be downloaded from the home page of The Research Council of Norway on the Internet: http://www.forskningsradet.no/utlysninger/

Applications must be submitted by 15 September 2001 to The Research Council of Norway, Postboks 2700, St. Hanshaugen, 0131 Oslo. It is also requested that an electronic version be sent to Tore Abrahamsen at the e-mail address stated above.