During the last decade there have been a number of changes in the management of Norwegians fisheries resources. Individual vessel quotas have been introduced in most fisheries, and different programs have also enabled limited transferability of quota. Thi s has led to a number of new opportunities as fishermen do not have to compete for quota but can focus on best exploitation of their quota as well as adapt the capacity to the expected quota. As the overcapacity has been substantial, the value generation potential is substantial as shown in several studies in Norway as well as in Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Moreover, with individual quotas the fishermen also have a greater opportunity to decide where and when to fish. This is an area tha t has received little attention from an economic perspective in Norwegian fisheries, but where there is an emerging international literature. The introduction of individual quotas also creates new challenges for fisheries management. For instance, as not all species are managed by quota, fishing pressure on non-quota species can increase. This is particularly relevant in Norwegian fisheries as there are only individual quotas for the main species. Increased fishing pressure increases the incentives for h ighgrading, this can also influences the stocks genetic composition. We will in this project obtain more knowledge about how fishermen respond to the changes in economic incentives due to the new types of management systems in Norwegian fisheries. This i s issues that Norwegian fisheries managers and fishers have in common with several other countries where similar measures have been implemented. With collaborators from the USA, we will also be able to compare the impact of the individual quotas with othe r similar systems in other fisheries. In addition, new econometric and theoretical tools enable us to investigate a number of new issues in relation to the questions what, where and when do the fishermen fish.